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In 2008, an amendment was proposed to the Colorado Constitution that sought 
to attach the rights and protections associated with legal “personhood” to any 
human being from the moment of fertilization. Although the initiative was defeated, 
it sparked a nation-wide Personhood Movement that has spurred similar efforts at 
the federal level and in over a dozen states. Personhood advocates choose terms like 
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“fertilization,” or phrases such as “human being at any stage of development,” to 
identify the “person”-defining moment in the reproductive process, and these 
designations have profound implications for reproductive choice. Proponents are 
outspoken in their desire to outlaw abortion, but they are less transparent about 
their intent with respect to other aspects of reproductive choice, such as 
contraception and infertility treatments. 
This paper describes the background of the Personhood Movement and its 
attempt to achieve legal protection of the preborn from the earliest moments of 
biological development. Following the late 2011 failure of the personhood measure 
in Mississippi, the language used within the Movement was dramatically changed in 
an attempt to address some of the concerns raised regarding implications for 
reproductive choice. Putting abortion to one side, this paper identifies why the 
personhood framework that is contemplated by the proposed changes does not 
eliminate the potential for restrictions on contraception and in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) that put the lives of these newly recognized persons at risk; nor should it if 
proponents intend to remain consistent with their position. The paper goes on to 
suggest what those restrictions might look like based on recent efforts being 
proposed at the state level and frameworks that have already been adopted in other 
countries. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Constitution does not define the word “person.” 1  More 
specifically, it does not clearly delineate who or what is included in the concept of 
“person” for purposes of bestowing the rights and protections that are found in the 
document.
2
 Nor does the Constitution tell us when life begins.
3
 Some may argue that 
defining “personhood” or “life” is best left to philosophers and theologians, but 
regardless of the philosophical or religious nature of these questions, the answers 
have profound implications for the law.
4
  
To date, the Supreme Court of the United States has been unwilling to fully 
extend the concept of personhood to the preborn
5
 for purposes of interpreting the 
                                                 
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973); Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed 
Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 371 (2007).  
2 See Karen G. Crockett & Miriam Hyman, Live Birth: A Condition Precedent to Recognition of 
Rights, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV. 805, 805 (1975) (“The question of when legal rights inhere in the unborn 
has never been clearly resolved.”). 
3 See Jason M. Horst, The Meaning of “Life”: The Morning-After Pill, the Question of When Life 
Begins, and Judicial Review, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 205, 206 (2006) (“The Court has been able to 
avoid dealing directly with [the] question of [when life begins] .”). 
4 It is not the purpose of this particular article to distinguish between concepts of “life” and 
“personhood.” Others have taken up the important task of exploring the nature of personhood, and 
“thick” (conscious experience/moral agency/rationality, etc.) v.  “thin” (biological) conceptions of life. 
See, e.g., Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, Individuals, Humans and Persons: The Issue of Moral Status , 
in EMBRYO EXPERIMENT’N 65 (Peter Singer et al. eds.,1990); Berg, supra note 1, at 375-76 (citing H. 
TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUNDATIONS OF BIOETHICS 104 (1986)); Caitlin E. Borgmann, 
The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate , 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 551 
(2008) [hereinafter Borgmann, Meaning of Life]; Khiara M. Bridges, A Reflection on Personhood and 
“Life,” 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 91 (2011); Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review of 
Abortion Regulations, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285 (2013). While there is certainly more to be said on 
these topics, the point of this project is to explore the implications of adopting a certain “thin,” 
biological conception of life and personhood as it relates to the potential for legal restrictions on 
reproductive choice. 
5 Interestingly, in the Supreme Court’s most recent abortion decision, it went as far as to say that 
“by common understanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a living organism while within the 
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Federal Constitution. After all, even viable fetuses are not entitled to the full 
complement of constitutional rights and protections. Justice Scalia maintains that the 
Constitution would permit individual states to allow “abortions on demand,” if they 
wish,
6
 and if viable fetuses are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, then equal  
protection might require all post-viability abortions to be outlawed, without the 
exceptions some states permit for rape and incest.
7
  
Perhaps due to the Supreme Court’s reluctance in this area, federal legislation 
has been proposed to specifically designate when human life begins (or when 
persons come into existence) for purposes of federal law,
8
 and several states (either 
through legislation or constitutional amendment) have undertaken measures to adopt 
such a personhood framework at the state level.
9
 Whether in proposed legislation or 
state constitutional amendments, advocates within this Personhood Movement 
choose terms like “fertilization,” or phrases such as “human being at any stage of 
development,” to identify the person-defining moment in the reproductive process. 
These designations have biological and legal significance.
10
  
Personhood proponents are outspoken in their desire to outlaw abortion, but 
they are less transparent about their intent with respect to contraception and 
infertility treatments. Since Roe v. Wade,
11
 however, the United States Supreme 
Court has consistently upheld a woman’s constitutional right to choose to have an 
abortion.
12
 Even if a personhood framework is adopted via statute or state 
constitutional amendment in an effort to outlaw abortion, it is entirely possible that 
the Court would strike down such provisions at least insofar as they are inconsistent 
with a woman’s constitutionally-protected privacy right. That said, any federal 
constitutional protection available in the context of access to contraception or 
infertility treatments is more tenuous.  
Courts and commentators frequently suggest that the U.S. Constitution protects 
a fundamental right to procreate, but the nature and scope of that right, to the extent 
it exists, is unclear.
13
 While Supreme Court precedent indicates that a state may not 
                                                                                                                      
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 147 (2007). 
While the Court was willing to say that the fetus is at least a living organism, it was apparently not 
comfortable defining the fetus as a human life or legal person entitled to the rights and protections 
associated therewith. See also Lisa McLennan Brown, Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women’s 
Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization , 13 AM. 
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 91 (2005) (noting that “Roe’s failure to define clearly what rights 
to personhood a fetus may hold has allowed states to undermine the Supreme Court’s holdings”).  
6 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
7  Borgmann, Meaning of Life, supra note 4, at 581; Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic 
Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 846 (2007). For arguments that 
abortion would be permissible even if a fetus is considered a “person,” see, e.g., Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971); Eileen L. McDonagh, My Body, My 
Consent: Securing the Constitutional Right to Abortion Funding, 62 ALB. L. REV. 1057 (1999); 
Donald H. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569 (1979); Robin West, Liberalism 
and Abortion, 87 GEO. L.J. 2117 (1999). In addition, not all persons are entitled to the same legal 
rights. Children have fewer rights than adults, and indeed, the law already recognizes different 
definitions of persons for different contexts, as when fetuses are considered persons  under certain 
criminal or tort statutes. Berg, supra note 1, at 373. 
8 See Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. (2013).  
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Parts III & IV. 
11 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
12 See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
13 See generally Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. 
L.J. 1 (2007); John A. Robertson, Assisting Reproduction, Choosing Genes, and the Scope of 
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outlaw or restrict access to all types of contraception,
14
 it is far less clear whether 
access to certain types of birth control could be restricted.
15
 This would be 
particularly true if a personhood framework passes, given that birth control’s 
mechanism of operation is effective after fertilization has taken place. The interest in 
protecting the rights of these newly recognized persons could lead to restrictions on 
any form of contraception that is or could be effective after fertilization has 
occurred. Further, the Supreme Court has yet to suggest that any fundamental right 
to procreate includes a right to have access to infertility treatments.
16
 Defining 
fertilized ova to be persons entitled to legal protection would seem to establish a 
strong interest in restricting treatments that put these persons at risk of injury or 
death. 
This lack of clarity regarding how a personhood framework might impact 
reproductive choice outside the abortion context has contributed to the failure of 
personhood measures in multiple states, and could be the reason why the federal 
Sanctity of Human Life Act, which was co-sponsored by Congressman and former 
vice-presidential candidate Paul Ryan, did not make it out of congressional 
committee when first proposed in 2011.
17
 While it may not have been surprising that 
personhood initiatives would be soundly defeated in a state such as Colorado,
18
 the 
late 2011 failure of a proposed personhood amendment to the Mississippi 
Constitution sparked drastic changes to the language utilized within the Personhood 
Movement.
19
 The revised language targets questions raised by previous iterations, 
but it does not dispel the most pressing concerns regarding reproductive choice. And 
while no state has adopted a personhood framework yet, at least nine states can 
                                                                                                                      
Reproductive Freedom, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1490 (2008) (examining the source of this right and 
its limits). 
14 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 679 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.  
438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
15 See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 
1167-72 (2008). 
16 Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process Right to In Vitro Fertili zation, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2793 (2005) (citing John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of 
Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 439, 453 (2003) (“The Supreme Court has never directly confronted 
the issue of whether access to [in vitro fertilization] should be considered a constitutionally protected 
fundamental right.”)).  
17  Nadia Kounang, Could ‘Personhood’ Bills Outlaw IVF?, CNN (Aug. 30, 2012), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/health/ivf-outlawed/index.html?hpt=he_t4. While Mitt Romney and 
Paul Ryan were not elected on November 6, 2012, Paul Ryan was reelected to his congressional seat, 
and commentators suggest that his political career will continue to advance. See, e.g., Samuel P. 
Jacobs, Despite Loss, Paul Ryan Has Bright Future, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2012), 
http://news.msn.com/politics/despite-loss-paul-ryan-has-bright-future. 
18 One opponent of the initiatives in Colorado recalled the “resounding defeat of [the 2008] 
measure,” and suggested that “it was a non-starter [in Colorado].” Electa Draper, “Personhood” Push 
Rejected, DENVER POST, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.denverpost.com/nationalpolitics/ci_10900171. 
19 The substantive text of the amendments proposed in Colorado in 2008 and 2010, and proposed 
in Mississippi in 2011, contained twenty words or less. See infra Part II. The revised language 
proposed in Colorado for the 2012 election cycle was over 200 words long. Colo. Initiative 46 (2011) 
(proposed COLO. CONST. art. II, § 32), available at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2011-2012/46Final.pdf 
[hereinafter Appendix I] (the proposal did not receive the requisite number of signatures to get on the 
2012 ballot). For the full text of the 2012 Colorado proposal, see infra Appendix I. Colorado 
Personhood Amendment Falls Short of Required Signatures to Make Ballot , HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 
30, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/29/colorado-personhood-amend_n_1840602.html. 
Similar language was put forward recently in Arkansas, but the Attorney General of Arkansas rejected 
the proposal. See Ark. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 2012-02 (2012), available at 
http://ag.arkansas.gov/opinions/docs/2012-002.pdf. 
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expect to see personhood measures in coming years.
20
 As of March 2013, the North 
Dakota Senate and House approved an initiative (which will now appear on the 
November 2014 ballot) to amend the state constitution to protect “the inalienable 
right to life of every human being at any stage of development.”21 
How we define “person,” or at what point rights attach to human life, will 
directly impact all things surrounding the reproductive process, regardless of the 
intent with which that process begins. It is true that such answers will affect the 
choices available to women once pregnant, but they will also inevitably impact such 
things as the availability of certain birth control options, and the permissiveness of 
various forms of assisted reproductive technologies (ART).  
The purpose of this article is to show why the revisions found in new 
personhood proposals at the state level
22
 do not adequately address the concerns 
raised regarding potential implications for reproductive choice. If a personhood 
framework is adopted, it is likely that restrictions on certain birth control methods 
and ART would soon follow. In a future article I will argue that, given the 
uncertainty regarding the nature and scope of any procreational liberty protected by 
the Constitution, it is very possible that such restrictions would be upheld.
23
 In short, 
regardless of the implications for abortion, certain forms of contraception and 
infertility treatments are particularly susceptible to successful restriction in the event 
that a personhood framework is adopted through legislation or state constitutional 
amendment.
24
  
To that end, Part II of the present article will provide a brief background of the 
Personhood Movement, including the unexpected failure of the proposed amendment 
to the Mississippi Constitution. Part III will explore the nature of the debates in 
Mississippi to provide context for debates likely to be held elsewhere, and will also 
introduce revisions made within the Personhood Movement to the language of future 
proposals in response to the failure in Mississippi. Part IV will then discuss how an 
understanding of the relevant biology and physiology of the reproductive 
process including contraception and IVF demonstrates why the new language 
being proposed within the Personhood Movement should not prove satisfying for 
those concerned about the potential for significant restrictions on reproductive 
choice. This is not to say that all such reproductive choices would be banned 
outright, but Part IV will also offer examples of what those restrictions might look 
                                                 
20 See Personhood Bills and Ballot Initiatives, RESOLVE: NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N, 
http://www.resolve.org/get-involved/personhood-bills-and-ballot-initiatives.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
2013). Further, as the political atmosphere changes, Congress may also revisit the Sanctity of Human 
Life Act. 
21 Laura Bassett, North Dakota Personhood Measure Passes State Senate , HUFFINGTON POST 
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/07/north-dakota-personhood_n_2640380.html 
[hereinafter Bassett, Senate]; Laura Bassett, North Dakota Personhood Measure Passes State House , 
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/22/north-dakota-
personhood_n_2934503.html [hereinafter Bassett, House]. 
22 The language used in the Sanctity of Human Life Act is similar to early iterations of state 
personhood proposals, and it thus raises the same issues regarding reproductive choice as those earlier 
measures. See infra Parts III & IV. See generally Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. 
(2013). 
23 Jonathan F. Will, Beyond Abortion: Pre-Embryonic Personhood and the Constitutionality of 
Restrictions on Reproductive Choice (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  
24 See Erik Eckholm, Push for ‘Personhood’ Amendment Represents New Tack in Abortion Fight, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/us/politics/personhood-amendments-
would-ban-nearly-all-abortions.html?pagewanted=all (suggesting the proposed Personhood 
Amendment would ban not only most abortions, but also “some birth control methods, including IUDs 
and ‘morning-after pills’”). 
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like under a personhood framework, assuming proponents intend to remain 
consistent with the position.  
II. PERSONHOOD MOVEMENT  
A. BACKGROUND 
Since the Supreme Court acknowledged a woman’s fundamental right to choose 
to terminate her pregnancy forty years ago,
25
 abortion opponents have been 
struggling to limit women’s ability to exercise that right. Over these decades, the 
Court has heard dozens of cases addressing the constitutionality of various 
restrictions on abortion.
26
 While Casey undoubtedly made it easier for states to 
impose such restrictions,
27
 nothing short of an absolute prohibition on abortion will 
appease the staunchest opponents. Acknowledging the “personhood” of the preborn 
is thought to be an avenue toward establishing a framework that would achieve this 
goal without direct reference to abortion.
28
 
Proponents of the now nationwide Personhood Movement use as their starting 
point Justice Blackmun’s language 29  in Roe that “[i]f this suggestion of [fetal] 
personhood is established, the appellant’s case [arguing in favor of women’s 
choice], of course, collapses, for the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed 
specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment.”30 The logic being, that if the legal 
personhood of fetuses is established, then this would prompt federal constitutional 
protection of the fetuses’ lives31 at the expense of women’s choice.  
                                                 
25 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169-70 (1973). 
26 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 
U.S. 398 (1981); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). 
27 Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-75 (finding that in the past the Court had been too quick to strike down 
state restrictions using strict scrutiny analysis and substituting that analysis with the undue burden 
standard moving forward). 
28 Excluded from this discussion are state statutes proposed either by citizens or the legislature 
with language explicitly attempting to restrict abortion. For instance, unsuccessful attempts were 
made in Oklahoma and Wyoming in the early 1990s to prohibit abortion except in the narrowest of 
circumstances. See Molly E. Carter, Note, Regulating Abortion Through Direct Democracy: The 
Liberty of All Versus the Moral Code of a Majority, 91 B.U. L. REV. 305, 307 (2011) (citing In re 
Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 3 (Okla. 1992) and Wyo. Nat’l Abortion Rights Action League 
v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 289 (Wyo. 1994)). A similar effort failed in South Dakota in 2006. See 
Borgmann, Meaning of Life, supra note 4, at 560. Also excluded from this discussion are statutes 
contingently enacted by certain states to ban abortion that would take effect if the Court overturns 
Roe. Id. at 560-61 n.50. 
29 See What is Personhood?, PERSONHOOD USA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/about-us/what-
is-personhood (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) (indicating that “personhood holds the key to filling the 
‘Blackmun Hole’”).  
30 Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-57. But cf. Thomson, supra note 7; Regan, supra note 7; West, supra 
note 7; and McDonagh, supra note 7 (arguing that abortion would be permissible even if a fetus is 
considered a “person”). Even a strong personhood proponent acknowledges in his Doctor of Juridical 
Science dissertation that Justice Blackmun was likely too quick in his assessment. See Charles L. 
Lugosi, Conforming to the Rule of Law: When Person and Human Being Finally Mean the Same 
Thing in Fourteenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 22 ISSUES L. & MED. 119, 289 (2006) (stating that 
Blackmun “may have been premature in suggesting the case for  abortion collapses once the unborn 
human being attains constitutional personhood, if credence is given to emergent new views that justify 
abortion of constitutional persons”). 
31 See About Us, PERSONHOOD USA, http://www.personhoodusa.com/about-us (last visited Oct. 
31, 2013) [hereinafter About Personhood] (stating that Personhood USA intends “to build the support 
of at least two thirds of the states in an effort to reaffirm personhood within the U.S. Constitution ”). 
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Regardless of whether, in fact, state definitions of personhood (or federal 
statutory definitions) have any impact on the interpretation of the Federal 
Constitution,
32
 personhood proponents are clear in their intent to challenge the legal 
underpinnings of the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence.33 While statutes or 
state constitutional amendments that define personhood may not be effective 
themselves in outlawing abortion, the hope is that a challenge to any such statute or 
amendment would make its way to the Supreme Court, giving the Court an 
opportunity to overturn its prior decisions regarding abortion.
34
  
The increased wave of attempts by states in the last five years
35
 to establish a 
personhood framework through statute or constitutional amendment can fairly be 
attributed to the work of Kristi Burton.
36
 In 2008, Ms. Burton worked with Colorado 
for Equal Rights to qualify a voter initiative that proposed an amendment 
(Amendment 48) to the Colorado Constitution.
37
 The text of this initiative, and that 
of more recent personhood measures,
38
 does not mention abortion, nor does it 
include the subordinating language found in Missouri’s preamble.39  
                                                 
32 Professor Borgmann illustrates the point this way: “a state could define a cow as a ‘person’ 
under state law. In such a case, the [United States Supreme] Court would still have to answer whether 
this recognition violated the constitutional rights of anyone recognized as a person under the [F]ederal 
Constitution.” Borgmann, Meaning of Life, supra note 4, at 576 n.118. In other words, personhood 
initiatives themselves would not necessarily outlaw abortion. Unless Roe is overturned, the Court 
would have to consider the extent to which recognition of preborn “personhood” restricts Roe’s 
acknowledgment of women’s constitutional right to choose to have an abortion. See also Carter, supra 
note 28, at 307 (discussing the appropriateness of using the democratic process to resolve the abortion 
debate, and citing In re Initiative Petition No. 349, 838 P.2d 1, 11 (Okla. 1992) for the proposition 
that the initiative process “was never intended to be a vehicle for amending the United States 
Constitution nor can it serve that function in our system of government”). 
33 What is Personhood, supra note 29 (stating that “to be a person is to be protected by a series of 
God-given rights and constitutional guarantees such as life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This 
terrifies the pro-abortion foes! They know that if we clearly define the preborn baby as a person, they 
will have the same right to life as all Americans do.”).  
34 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma recently vetoed personhood language similar to that which 
was proposed in Colorado in 2012. See Randy Krehbiel, Group Requests Personhood Appeal from 
U.S. Supreme Court, TULSA WORLD, July 31, 2012, 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/printerfriendlystory.aspx?articleid=20120731_16_a9_clrdae519381  
(expressing Personhood USA’s hope that the United States Supreme Court will use the dispute 
surrounding Oklahoma’s proposed personhood amendment as an opportunity to overturn Casey [and 
thereby Roe]). The United States Supreme Court has since denied certiorari in the case. In re Initiative 
No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P.3d 637 (Okla. 2012), cert. denied, Personhood Okla. v. 
Barber, 133 S. Ct. 528 (2012). 
35 Over twenty years ago, a statute regulating abortions was introduced in Missouri that included 
a preamble stating that “‘[t]he life of each human being begins at conception,’ and that ‘unborn 
children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being.’” Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 
492 U.S. 490, 501 (1988) (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205.1(1)-(2) (1986)). But unlike modern 
personhood proposals, the Missouri statute expressly subordinates itself to Supreme Court precedent, 
including Roe, and because the statute had not been used to restrict women’s rights in violation of 
Roe, when the statute was challenged, the Court determined that it did not have to pass upon the 
constitutionality of the preamble. Webster, 492 U.S. at 506-07.  
36  Adam Cayton-Holland, Meet Kristi Burton, The 21-Year-Old Pro-Lifer Behind The 
Personhood Amendment, WESTWORD NEWS, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.westword.com/2008-09-
25/news/meet-kristi-burton-the-22-year-old-pro-lifer-behind-the-personhood-amendment/.  
37 Leslie Jorgensen, Personhood Amendment Revised and Revived , COLORADO STATESMAN, July 
3, 2009, http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/991130-personhood-amendment-revised-and-
revived. 
38 See supra note 19; see infra Appendix I. This discussion is focused on efforts by states to 
avoid specifically mentioning abortion by defining the term “person” to include the preborn through 
statute or constitutional amendment.  
39 For the relevant text of Missouri’s preamble, see supra note 35. 
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Specifically, proposed Amendment 48 sought to add a new section to the 
Colorado Constitution that would have simply read “Section 31. Person defined. As 
used in sections 3, 6, and 25 of article II of the state constitution, the terms ‘person’ 
or ‘persons’ shall include any human being from the moment of fertilization.”40 
Although seventy-three percent of the Colorado electorate voted against this 
proposal, the day after the vote, Keith Mason founded Personhood USA to continue 
the effort.
41
 
Personhood USA is a national organization with many regional affiliates
42
 that 
identifies itself as a non-profit Christian ministry that “serves the pro-life community 
by assisting local groups to initiate citizen, legislative, and political action focusing 
on the ultimate goal of the pro-life movement: personhood rights for all innocent 
humans.”43 Among other things, the organization is committed to “moving churches 
and the culture to make the dehumanization and murdering of preborn children 
unthinkable.”44 Some have suggested that the Personhood Movement is simply about 
returning to first principles,
45
 and Personhood USA itself is very specific: the 
movement is about “working to respect the God-given right to life recognizing all 
human beings as persons who are ‘created in the image of God’ from the beginning 
of their biological development, without exceptions.” 46  This language expressly 
adopts a thin, biological definition of life and personhood,
47
 and there is nothing on 
its face limiting its applicability to abortion. 
Although the position is subject to challenge as being inappropriately speciesest, 
proponents maintain that the only criterion relevant to assigning the protections 
associated with legal personhood is membership in the Homo sapiens species.
48
 
After all, under the revised language every human being is a “person,” and human 
beings include “every member of the species [H]omo sapiens at any stage of 
development.”49 The Sanctity of Human Life Act similarly states that “human being” 
includes “every member of the species [H]omo sapiens at all stages of life.” 50 
                                                 
40  See Colo. Initiative 36 (2008) (proposed COLO. CONST. art II, § 23), available at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2007-2008/Final36-0708.pdf.  
41  Abigail Pesta, Behind ‘Personhood’ Leader Keith Mason’s Anti-Abortion Crusade, 
NEWSWEEK (June 25, 2012), http://mag.newsweek.com/2012/06/24/personhood-usa-s-keith-mason-
eyes-election-day-2012.html. 
42  See, e.g., COLO. PERSONHOOD COALITION, http://personhoodco.com (last visited Oct. 20, 
2013); PERSONHOOD FLA., http://personhoodfl.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD MISS., 
http://www.personhoodmississippi.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD N.D., 
http://personhoodnorthdakota.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD OKLA., 
http://personhoodoklahoma.com/news (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); PERSONHOOD WIS., 
http://www.personhoodwisconsin.com (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 
43 See About Personhood, supra note 31. 
44 Id. 
45 See, e.g., DANIEL C. BECKER, PERSONHOOD: A PRAGMATIC GUIDE TO PROLIFE VICTORY IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES IN POLITICS (2011). 
46 About Personhood, supra note 31. 
47 See supra note 4 and infra note 178. 
48 E.g., Jonathan Will et al., When Potential Does Not Matter: What Developments in Cellular 
Biology Tell Us About the Concept of Legal Personhood, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 38, 39 (2013) (citing 
generally to PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION: A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 
(1975)). Under this view, the belief that human life should be protected because it is innately valuable 
or “sacred just in itself” is detached from any requirement that the life in quest ion has interests of its 
own. RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 11-13 (1993).  
49 See infra Appendix I. 
50 Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 23, 113th Cong. § 3(3) (Jan. 2013).  
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Further, proponents are clear that for them membership in the species begins at the 
outset of biological development.
51
 
This approach stands in contrast to other ways in which we might define legal or 
moral personhood. For instance, one might agree with the human species concept, 
yet maintain that membership does not occur until a later time in development, such 
as the appearance of the primitive streak around fourteen days after fertilization,
52
 or 
when other evidence of “life” is present like a detectable heartbeat (five to six 
weeks)
53
 or electrical activity in the early brain (eight weeks).
54
 One could also 
assign legal or moral personhood to a pre-embryo
55
 not because of its current state, 
but because it has the potential to develop into a born human being.
56
 Yet another 
approach rejects the significance of membership in the Homo sapiens species, and 
instead would attach legal or moral personhood at the point when the developing 
organism attains certain capacities, such as the capacity to experience pain
57
 or for 
rational thought or self-consciousness.
58
 Interestingly, one could try to identify fetal 
viability as the person-defining criterion using any of these approaches. For instance, 
membership in the species could be deemed to begin at viability; or a fetus might be 
considered to have sufficient potential of becoming a born human at the point of 
viability such that it is then worthy of legal protection; or, as the Supreme Court 
noted in Roe, one could say that at viability the fetus has the capacity for 
                                                 
51  See infra notes 173-189 and accompanying text (discussing the biology of early human 
development). The argument generally raised in support of this position is that once the egg and sperm 
have united, a unique genetic human being exists. CYNTHIA B. COHEN, RENEWING THE STUFF OF LIFE: 
STEM CELLS, ETHICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 61-67 (2007) (identifying and critiquing this position). 
52 COHEN, supra note 51, at 68. 
53 David F. Forte, Life, Heartbeat, Birth: A Medical Basis for Reform, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 140-
43 (2013). The heart may begin to beat as early as twenty-two days after fertilization. Kirsten Rabe 
Smolensky, Defining Life from the Perspective of Death: An Introduction to the Forced Symmetry 
Approach, 2006 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 41, 81 n.200 (citing WILLIAM J. LARSEN, HUMAN EMBRYOLOGY 
166 (2001)). 
54 Smolensky, supra note 53, at 69-70. 
55 “Pre-embryo” will be the term used throughout this paper to refer to the fertilized ovum from 
the time the sperm penetrates the egg until roughly two weeks later when the primitive streak develops 
and/or implantation is complete. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 592-94 (Tenn. 1992) (detailing 
scientific justification for distinguishing between the terms “embryo” and “pre -embryo”). Not all 
commentators support making this terminological distinction. See, e.g., Louis M. Guenin, On 
Classifying the Developing Organism, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1115 (2004) (arguing that these distinctions 
do not add value to moral discussions regarding such things as embryonic stem cell research). Cf. Ann 
A. Kiessling, What is an Embryo?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2004) (arguing that use of the technical 
terms informs our understanding of the morality of these activities).  
56  See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 51, at 73-78; Marco Stier & Bettina Schoene-Seifert, The 
Argument from Potentiality in the Embryo Protection Debate: Finally ‘Depotentialized’?, 13 AM. J. 
BIOETHICS 19 (2013) (identifying and critiquing this position); Will et al., supra note 48 (discussing 
arguments from potentiality and how any determination of when there is sufficient “potential” to 
warrant legal protection is subject to a charge of arbitrariness).  
57 See I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the Constitution , 39 
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 235, 240 (2011) (identifying and challenging the argument “that the capacity to 
feel pain is itself a criterion of constitutional personhood” that could be raised in defense of 
Nebraska’s statute outlawing abortion at twenty-weeks’ gestation). 
58 COHEN, supra note 51, at 81-83 (identifying and critiquing this position). Peter Singer is well 
known for his support of this position, which is willing to assign personhood to certain high -
functioning, non-human species while withholding the designation from certain low-functioning 
humans. Id. (citing generally to PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS (1993)). See also John A. 
Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early Embryos , 76 VA. L. REV. 437, 444-46 (1990) 
(noting the difference between the human species approach and the capacity approach). Proponents of 
the Personhood Movement obviously reject any notion that sentience or conscious experience is a 
prerequisite to attaching moral worth and full legal protection to the human life in question.   
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“meaningful life outside the mother’s womb,”59 so as to make the State’s interest in 
protecting fetal life compelling at that point.  
In an interesting article, Jessica Berg outlines a different kind of personhood 
framework
60
 where she suggests that a claim to the protections of legal personhood 
in the context of the non-sentient (those without interests or consciousness) must be 
based not on the entity’s own interests (since it has none), but on the protection of 
interests of others.
61
 She further argues that legal protection of the non-sentient may 
be more limited than that afforded to persons with interests.
62
  
By way of example, Professor Berg points out that at birth, the law currently 
protects the life of even non-sentient human beings, such as an anencephalic infant 
who lacks the cortical structures necessary for consciousness, not because the 
anencephalic infant herself has a claim to protection of her own interests, but 
“because there is a societal interest in encouraging specific caring behaviors towards 
all infants (and discouraging other behaviors such as infanticide).” 63  This is 
important since, at least in part, the suggestion could be made that because 
anencephalic infants appear very much like newborn babies with normal cortical 
function, a societal interest exists in protecting them as legal persons 
notwithstanding their lack of their own interests.
64
 Another example can be seen in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, where the Court references Congress’ statement that permitting 
partial-birth abortions in the second trimester (at which point the fetus has 
recognizably human features) would “further coarsen society to the humanity of not 
only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent human life, making it increasingly 
difficult to protect such life.”65 But the same would arguably not be true for the 
entity existing very early in biological development (say a single-celled zygote, 
which does not appear to share many characteristics with a newborn person), and 
this may suggest that the interests of others would not be sufficient at this earlier 
stage to protect this non-sentient entity as a legal person.
66
  
But those in support of the Personhood Movement would counter that society 
has a sufficient interest in acknowledging the value of and offering protection to all 
members of the Homo sapiens species without regard to sentience. In fact, the 
devaluing of what is considered to be human life (by not protecting it) is considered 
by personhood proponents to be a great detriment to societal interests.
67
 How early 
in the developmental process the Court would acknowledge such a societal or state-
asserted interest is unclear. But in this regard, it is interesting to note that the 
Personhood Movement appears (even if inadvertently) to be taking Justice Rehnquist 
up on his suggestion in Cruzan (in the end-of-life context) that States “may properly 
decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular person may 
enjoy and may simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of human 
                                                 
59 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973). 
60 Berg, supra note 1, at 375-79. 
61  Id. at 376; cf. DWORKIN, supra note 48, at 11-13 (describing the “detached objection to 
abortion,” which is a claim against abortion based on the belief that human life has intrinsic value 
regardless of whether the human has its own interests). 
62  Berg, supra note 1, at 376. It is on this point that Personhood proponents would surely 
disagree. 
63 Id. at 378. 
64 Id. at 387. 
65 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).  
66 Berg, supra note 1, at 391. John Robertson has argued that pre-embryos are owed special 
(though not full) protection based on their potential to become human, and because they are symbols 
of human life. Robertson, supra note 58, at 446-48. 
67 See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text. 
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life.”68 In a sense then, personhood efforts seem to support the claim made by Justice 
Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Cruzan, that when a state asserts such an 
unqualified interest in protecting life (even in the end-of-life context), it is really “an 
effort to define life, rather than to protect it.”69  
The Personhood Movement, at its core, is about adopting a “thin,” unqualified, 
and biological definition of personhood that would attach full moral status and legal 
protection to the life of the preborn and place them on equal footing with the born,
70
 
and in 2010 Personhood USA successfully placed another citizen-driven 
constitutional amendment on the ballot in Colorado.
71
 The language the second time 
around was slightly different.
72
 The 2010 version was intended to apply to the same 
constitutional provisions, but this time the proposed amendment stated that the terms 
“person” or “persons” shall apply “to every human being from the beginning of the 
biological development of that human being.” 73  Here the term fertilization was 
removed, and the stated reason for this change was to broaden the scope to make 
sure that the provision included any persons created through asexual reproduction, 
like cloning.
74
 As occurred in 2008,
75
 opponents of the 2010 measure raised 
concerns that the proposal would have impacts on contraception, fertility treatments, 
and the medical treatment of pregnant women.
76
 These concerns were publicly 
labeled as scare tactics by Personhood USA,
77
 but although the language of the 
initiative was different, the result was the same, with the Colorado electorate voting 
against the 2010 proposed amendment by a margin of three to one.
78
 After 
resounding defeats in Colorado,
79
 Personhood USA directed its efforts at arguably 
                                                 
68 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 282 (1990). 
69 Id. at 344 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
70 See infra Parts III & IV for the implications of such a framework. 
71  Colo. Initiative 25 (2010) (proposed COLO. CONST. art II, § 23), available at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs//elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2009-2010/25Final.pdf. 
72 Compare id. with Colo. Initiative 36 (2008) (proposed COLO. CONST. art II, § 23), available at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2007-2008/Final36-0708.pdf.  
73 Colo. Initiative 25 (proposed COLO. CONST. art II, § 23). 
74 Jorgenson, supra note 37. See also Dianne N. Irving, Problems with Colorado’s “Personhood” 
Amendment: The Phrase, “From the Moment of Fertilization,” LIFEISSUES.NET (May 31, 2008), 
http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_126colorado.html (suggesting that the term “fertilization” 
would not encompass naturally occurring twinning or the use of cloning).  
75 Draper, supra note 18. 
76 Electa Draper, “Personhood” Amendment Fails by 3-1 Margin, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 2010, 
http://www.denverpost.com/election2010/ci_16506253. 
77 Jorgenson, supra note 37. 
78 Id. Interestingly, far less money was raised in campaign efforts the second time around. In 
2008, supporters of Amendment 48 raised over $350,000, while opponents raised in excess of $1.8 
million, but in 2010 those numbers were down to around $50,000 and $578,000, respectively. Id.; 
Draper, supra note 75.  
79 In 2010 an Alaskan citizen proposed an amendment to existing state legislation that sought to 
“protect the natural right to life and body of all mankind from the beginning of biological 
development,” and stated that “the natural right to life and body of the unborn child supercedes [sic] 
the statutory right of the mother to consent to the injury or death of her unborn child.” Alaska Natural 
Right to Life Initiative (2011) (proposed ALASKA CONST. art I, § 18.01), available at 
http://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/10NRTL/10NRTL_Sponsor_Language.pdf (last visited Oct. 
31, 2013). Alaska’s Lieutenant Governor rejected the initiative after determining that he was 
“convinced the controlling case law [including Roe] made [the initiative] clearly unconstitutional,” 
because both the Alaska and Federal Constitutions protect a woman ’s right to privacy. Pat Forgey, 
State Rejects Anti-Abortion Ballot Measure, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Jan. 12, 2011), 
http://juneauempire.com/stories/011211/loc_768878153.shtml. For a discussion of legislative efforts 
in Georgia, Louisiana, and North Dakota targeted more directly at reproductive technologies, see infra 
Part IV.  
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the most conservative state in the Union
80
 in the 2011 election cycle.
81
  
B. PERSONHOOD GOES TO MISSISSIPPI 
Like Colorado’s Constitution, the Mississippi Constitution can be amended by 
citizen initiative
82
 and, if it had passed, Measure 26 would have amended the Bill of 
Rights of the Mississippi Constitution to define the term “person” or “persons” to 
“include every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the 
functional equivalent thereof.”83  
Unlike in Colorado, where pre-election polling in both 2008
84
 and 2010
85
 
foretold the defeat of personhood initiatives there, some initial reports in Mississippi 
showed an excess of eighty percent of the electorate in favor of Measure 26.
86
 
Indeed, candidates running for office on both the Republican and Democratic 
tickets—including both candidates for Governor—expressed open support for the 
amendment.
87
 As the election neared, however, support within the populace began to 
wane, and on November 8, 2011, Measure 26 failed with nearly fifty-eight percent 
of the electorate voting against it.
88
  
Immediately after the election, analysts began the work of determining what 
caused such an unexpected collapse.
89
 One commentator identified several possible 
reasons for the failure.
90
 For one, the language was poorly drafted,
91
 and its inherent 
                                                 
80 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Jones, Mississippi Rates as the Most Conservative U.S. State, GALLUP 
POLITICS (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/146348/mississippi-rates-conservative-
state.aspx. 
81 See generally Jonathan F. Will, Measure 26: Fear Mongering, Self-Execution & Potential 
Implications for Birth Control, 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 63 (2011) [hereinafter Will, Measure 26] 
(describing personhood efforts in Mississippi). 
82 MISS. CONST. art XV, § 273. 
83  Miss. Initiative 26 (2011) (proposed MISS. CONST. art. III, § 33), available at 
http://www.sos.ms.gov/initiatives/Definition%20of%20Person-PW%20Revised.pdf.  
84  Bente Birkeland, ‘Personhood’ Amendment on Colorado Ballot, NPR (Oct. 29, 2008), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96167092. 
85 Steven Ertelt, Second Poll: Colorado Personhood Amendment Likely to Lose , LIVENEWS.COM 
(Oct. 25, 2010), http://www.lifenews.com/2010/10/25/state-5601/.  
86 Peter Roff, Mississippi Voters May Change Abortion Debate, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011), 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/peter-roff/2011/10/14/mississippi-voters-may-change-abortion-
debate. 
87 Id. 
88 MISS. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL TABULATION OF VOTE FOR STATEWIDE INITIATIVE MEASURE 
NO. 26 (2011), 
http://www.sos.ms.gov/links/elections/results/statewide/Statewide%20Initiative%20Measure%2026%
20-%20General%20Election%202011%20Results.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2013). In March of 2013, 
Ann Reed submitted a new personhood proposal to the Mississippi Secretary of State that would 
amend the state constitution by adding a new section that would read: “The right to life begins at 
conception. All human beings at every stage of development are unique, created in the image of God, 
and shall enjoy the inalienable right to life as persons under the law.” Meet the Sponsor, PERSONHOOD 
MISS. (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.personhoodmississippi.com/home-featured/meet-the-sponsor-of-the-
life-at-conception-citizens-intiative/. 
89 See Mississippi Anti-Abortion ‘Personhood’ Amendment Fails at Ballot Box, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 9, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mississippi-anti-abortion-personhood-
amendment-fails-at-ballot-box/2011/11/09/gIQAzQl95M_story.html. 
90 Burns Strider, 6 Reasons Mississippians Said No to “Personhood” Amendment, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/burns-strider/personhood-amendment-
_b_1083079.html. 
91 Id. 
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ambiguities
92
 saw the same concerns previously seen in Colorado raised regarding 
potential impacts on the treatment of pregnant women, restrictions on contraception, 
and restrictions on IVF.
93
 In addition, major religious figures, like Episcopal, 
Methodist, and Catholic Bishops in Mississippi did not support the measure, nor did 
the president of the Mississippi NAACP.
94
 Interestingly, while outgoing Governor 
Haley Barbour ultimately voted in favor of the initiative, he first publicly voiced his 
concerns about it.
95
 Finally, Personhood USA faced stauncher opposition in 
conservative Mississippi than it may have anticipated.
96
 Local groups like 
Mississippians for Healthy Families
97
 and Parents Against 26
98
 organized efforts in 
opposition to the amendment, which reached thousands of citizens.
99
  
For its part, Personhood USA performed exit polling in an attempt to discover 
what caused the unanticipated defeat in Mississippi.
100
 The poll suggested that the 
amendment’s failure could not be attributed to a large group of previously-
unidentified abortion-rights voters in Mississippi; rather, only 8% of the ten 
thousand people polled indicated that they voted against the measure because they 
identify themselves as “pro-choice.”101 A greater percentage (12%) said that they 
voted against Measure 26 because then-Governor Haley Barbour expressed concerns 
about it.
102
 But the two most common reasons indicated for voting against the 
initiative had to do with potential implications for (a) the medical treatment of 
pregnant women (28%), and (b) the availability of IVF (31%).
103
  
When reporting the results of this polling, Personhood USA noted that 
proponents of Measure 26 had repeatedly said that “the amendment could not ban in 
vitro fertilization, contraception, or healthcare for women,” but that “Planned 
Parenthood (under the guise of Mississippians for Healthy Families), persisted in 
lying to Mississippi voters, propagating scare tactics that were proven false 
numerous times.”104 From Personhood USA’s perspective, the poll made clear that 
                                                 
92  See I. Glenn Cohen & Jonathan F. Will, Op-Ed, Mississippi’s Ambiguous ‘Personhood’ 
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/31/opinion/mississippis-
ambiguous-personhood-amendment.html. 
93 See, e.g., Elizabeth Crisp, Mississippians to Vote on ‘Personhood’ Initiative, USA TODAY, 
Nov. 6, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-11-06/mississippi-voters-to-vote-on-
personhood-initiative/51098740/1; Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 64; Jonathan F. Will, Op-Ed, 
Life and Law—The Commitment to Pre-Embryonic Personhood, MISS. BUS. J. (Sep. 23, 2011), 
http://msbusiness.com/2011/09/op-ed-life-and-law-%E2%80%94%C2%A0the-commitment-to-pre-
embryonic-personhood/ [hereinafter Will, Life and Law]. In addition to writing on the topic, I 
organized a panel at Mississippi College School of Law to discuss the amendment and its potential 
implications. See infra note 118 and accompanying text. 
94 Strider, supra note 90. 
95 Id.  
96 Id. 
97  Personhood USA was adamant that Mississippians for Healthy Families was a front for 
Planned Parenthood and the ACLU. See Live Action and Personhood USA Release New Sting 
Operation in Mississippi Before Personhood Vote, PRWEB (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.prweb.com/releases/2011/10/prweb8924956.htm.  
98 See generally PARENTS AGAINST MS 26, http://parentsagainstms26.com (last visited Nov. 1, 
2013). 
99 Strider, supra note 90. 
100  Keith Ashley, New Poll Reveals Real Reason Behind Mississippi Personhood Loss , 
PERSONHOOD USA (Nov. 22, 2011), http://cm.personhoodusa.com/press-release/new-poll-reveals-
real-reason-behind-mississippi-personhood-loss. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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“Planned Parenthood’s willful deceit, which also raised doubts in the mind of 
Governor Haley Barbour, caused the defeat of [Measure] 26.”105  
In response to Planned Parenthood’s perceived lies, Personhood USA drastically 
revised the language to be used in future personhood efforts.
106
 In Mason’s own 
words, the “new personhood language prevents those falsehoods by making it 
absolutely clear what the amendment can and cannot do—while still protecting 
every child from his or her earliest stages.” 107  In order to fully appreciate the 
revisions made,
108
 and how “absolutely clear”109 they really are, it is first necessary 
to understand the nature of the debates in Mississippi to provide context to the 
broader debates concerning personhood. As it turns out, not all of the proponents of 
Measure 26 were consistent in what they believed the amendment could and could 
not (or should and should not) do. 
III. DEBATING PERSONHOOD 
There were two primary and related questions that drove most of the discussions 
surrounding Measure 26 leading up to the vote: (1) what would (or could) happen 
immediately after the amendment became effective were it to pass; and (2) what 
impact, if any, would the amendment have on (a) the treatment of pregnant women 
(as well as those suffering miscarriages), (b) contraception, and (c) IVF.
110
  
A. IMMEDIATE IMPACT  
The immediate legal impact that Measure 26 would (or could) have had was 
never clear, in part because the language of the amendment was silent in this 
regard.
111
 For instance, it is possible that as soon as the amendment became 
effective, thousands of references in the Mississippi Code to “person” or “persons,” 
including in homicide statutes, would have needed to be understood to include every 
human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning, or the functional equivalent 
thereof. In such a case, Measure 26 would have been effectively self-executing, 
since no enabling legislation would have been needed to set it in motion.
112
 Abortion 
becomes immediately problematic, because the existing statutory framework 
includes laws criminalizing the intentional killing of persons. Indeed, any loss of life 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106  See, e.g., Electa Draper, Personhood USA Again Pushes for Right-to-Life Amendment to 
Colorado Constitution, DENVER POST, Nov. 22, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_19387552 
(noting that similar efforts would be pursued in Oregon and Montana); Stephanie Samuel , New Colo. 
Personhood Amendment Features New, Improved Language , CHRISTIAN POST, Nov. 22, 2011, 
http://www.christianpost.com/news/new-colo-personhood-amendment-features-new-improved-
language-62627/. 
107 Samuel, supra note 106.  
108 See infra Appendix I for the text of the new language that was proposed in Colorado. Part III 
briefly outlines the central debates in Mississippi, and also introduces the revisions made to the 
personhood language in response thereto. Part IV then discusses in detail the revisions pertaining to 
contraception and IVF, and why those revisions do not adequately address the primary concerns raised 
regarding reproductive choice. 
109 Samuel, supra note 106. 
110 See generally Cohen & Will, supra note 92; Will, Measure 26, supra note 81; Will, Life and 
Law, supra note 93 (discussing these questions). The University of Mississippi School of Law 
published a useful symposium related to Measure 26. Mississippi Personhood and Initiative 26 
Symposium, 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA i (2011), available at 
http://mississippilawjournal.org/category/volume-81/supra-volume-81/. 
111 See Cohen & Will, supra note 92. 
112 Id. 
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of these newly recognized persons could be investigated and prosecuted using the 
existing statutory framework.
113
  
On the other hand, it is also possible that the amendment would have been 
interpreted to require enabling legislation to set it in motion, in which case, the 
amendment itself would have had no immediate impact (on abortion or 
otherwise).
114
 Under this scenario, after passage, discussions would have been held 
regarding what the enabling legislation should look like, and certainly an anti-
abortion statute would have been expected.
115
 But supporters of Measure 26 did not 
express consistent positions regarding whether the amendment was intended to be 
effectively self-executing.
116
  
For instance, some proponents of the amendment suggested that Measure 26 
merely set forth constitutional principles, and that it would need enabling 
legislation.
117
 At a symposium hosted by Mississippi College School of Law that I 
helped to organize in advance of the November election, the General Counsel of 
Liberty Counsel, which defended Measure 26 in legal challenges in Mississippi 
courts, suggested that the proposed amendment would require enabling legislation to 
be effective; however, at the same symposium, a national spokeswoman for 
Personhood USA indicated that she believed that after the amendment became 
effective, local prosecutors would immediately be permitted to decide whether to 
conduct investigations involving the loss of life of these newly recognized 
persons.
118
  
As Professor Borgmann pointed out, many supporters of Measure 26, who 
thought they were voting on an abortion ban, may have been surprised if the 
amendment passed and yet had no immediate impact.
119
 And because Measure 26 
failed, the Mississippi Supreme Court never had to address the question of whether, 
under state law, the amendment would have been effectively self-executing. In 
response to the uncertainty raised in Mississippi on this issue, the revised 
personhood language that was proposed in Colorado and elsewhere explicitly states 
that “all provisions [of the amendment] are self-executing and are severable.”120  
The significance of this position should not be lost. With no need for legislation 
to be enacted, these proponents seem to be suggesting that no discussion need be had 
                                                 
113 Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 70-74; see also Deborah Bell, Disputes Over Frozen 
Embryos, 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 105, 113 (2011) (suggesting that courts, when confronted with disputes 
over dispositions of embryos, would be unlikely to ignore the “strong statement of policy” contained 
in Measure 26 when determining how to apply existing law).  
114 See Christopher R. Green, A Textual Analysis of the Possible Impact of Measure 26 on the 
Mississippi Bill of Rights, 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 39, 41 (2011) (considering whether Measure 26 could 
have outlawed abortion in Mississippi on its own). 
115 See Cohen & Will, supra note 92. 
116 Id. 
117  See Caitlin E. Borgmann, What the Mississippi Personhood Amendment Tells Us About 
“Life,” 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 115, 117 (2011); see also Memorandum from the Liberty Counsel to the 
Personhood Amendment Physicians’ Working Grp. & Other Interested Parties 1 (Sep. 17, 2011), 
http://yeson26.net/media/2455/personhoodphysiciansworkinggroupcivillawmemo.pdf . 
118 Stephen Crampton & Rebecca Kiessling, Address at the Mississippi College School of Law 
Symposium: Amendment 26—Exploring the Implications of Mississippi’s Personhood Initiative (Oct. 
25, 2011). For descriptions of panelists’ comments, see Debating Mississippi’s “Personhood 
Amendment,” CBS NEWS, Oct. 26, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-
20126236/debating-mississippis-personhood-amendment/; Valerie Wells, Personhood: A Pandora’s 
Box, JACKSON FREE PRESS, Nov. 2, 2011, 
http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2011/nov/02/personhood-a-pandoras-box/ (describing 
panelists comments during the Symposium). 
119 Borgmann, supra note 117, at 117. 
120 See infra Appendix I. 
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by elected officials regarding the nature and scope of the amendment. Rather than 
subsequent political discussion defining the impact of the amendment on such things 
as abortion, the treatment of pregnant women, contraception or IVF, the amendment 
itself would dictate that the existing statutory framework is capable of dealing with 
these issues taking into account the new definition of the term “person.”121 Just as 
abortion would immediately become problematic, so too would the treatment of 
pregnant women, contraception, and IVF that involve the death of newly recognized 
persons. The existing statutory framework would treat these deaths just like any 
other loss of human life. 
That said, the amendment’s identifying itself as self-executing would not likely 
end the inquiry. When this revised language was recently introduced in Arkansas, 
the attorney general noted in his opinion rejecting the proposal that, given the 
changes that would be needed to the Arkansas Code if the proposal were to pass, the 
amendment could not be self-executing.
122
 Whether a given personhood amendment 
could be self-executing is a matter of individual state law
123
an exploration of 
which is beyond the scope of this article. The revised language, however, makes 
clear that certain proponents have officially taken the position that they intend these 
amendments to have an immediate impact should they pass without further political 
discourse.  
 A different approach was taken recently in North Dakota. There, the State 
Senate approved a personhood initiative to amend the state constitution to add a very 
short statement protecting human life at any stage of development;
124
 however, a 
piece of enabling legislation (S.B. 2302) dealing with such things as birth control 
and IVF was simultaneously proposed in the Senate to take effect if the 
constitutional amendment is approved by the citizens of North Dakota.
125
 While S.B. 
2302 was struck down by the Senate, since the constitutional initiative was approved 
by the House, it will appear on the ballot in 2014.
126
 And if the constitutional 
amendment passes, the North Dakota legislature is likely to revisit the implications 
for birth control and IVF.
127
  
But if adoption of a personhood amendment is intended to have an immediate 
impact on the existing statutory framework without the need for enabling legislation, 
as it could in some states, what would that mean for the treatment of pregnant 
women, contraception, and IVF (question two from above)? Part IV of this article 
will focus on implications for reproductive choice, including contraception and IVF, 
but a few words on the treatment of pregnant women and miscarriages are in order.  
                                                 
121 Further, certain existing laws pertaining to the preborn would become redundant at best, or 
unconstitutional at worst. There would be no need for specific feticide statutes, because fetuses would 
be treated no differently (save for proposed exceptions in the personhood amendment itself) than any 
other person. In fact, to treat the death of a fetus differently could raise equal protection issues under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, just as it would if we treated the death of toddlers differently than that of 
teenagers or adults. It would seem to be a violation of the equal protection of the toddler if the law 
were written to say that the unintentional killing of a toddler is not prohibited, or that the killing of a 
toddler is punishable by a maximum of only two years in prison. This is not to say that the Court 
would be precluded from determining that a fetus is sufficiently different than a born person so as to 
permit different treatment. 
122 Ark. Att’y Gen. Op., supra note 19. 
123 See generally Will, Measure 26, supra note 81. 
124 See Bassett, Senate, supra note 21. 
125 See S.B. 2302, 63d Legis. Assemb., § 13 (N.D. 2013), available at 
http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-8231-02000.pdf?20130213153739. 
126 Bassett, House, supra note 21.  . 
127 See infra Parts III & IV. 
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B. TREATMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN AND MISCARRIAGES 
With regard to treating pregnant women, the question pertains to whether 
recognizing fertilized ova (however fertilization is to be defined)
128
 as having the 
same legal status as pregnant women restricts the treatment options available for 
pregnant women. The most common concern raised in the media in particular by 
physicians involved the treatment of women with ectopic or molar pregnancies, 
which can prove life-threatening for pregnant women, and necessarily requires 
termination of the pregnancies.
129
 Some suggested that treating pregnant women in 
such cases could lead to civil or criminal penalties if Measure 26 were to pass.
130
  
Perhaps not surprisingly, those within the Personhood Movement labeled such 
concerns as false information and scare tactics.
131
 Dr. Freda Bush, a vocal 
personhood proponent and Mississippi obstetrician, was comfortable that existing 
Mississippi laws would protect physicians treating pregnant women in emergency 
situations, but Dr. Paul Seago, a gynecologic oncologist in the State Capital, was 
concerned about treatments for women with cancer, many of which would endanger 
the fetus.
132
 At the time, Keith Mason’s wife Jennifer, who serves as the 
communications director of Personhood USA, conceded that abortion would not be 
permitted for women with cancer.
133
  
In Mississippi, certain statutes dealing with justifiable
134
 or excusable
135
 
homicide would arguably have been available to defend physicians treating pregnant 
women in these circumstances.
136
 The United States Supreme Court has also 
referenced the principle of double effect when considering situations in which death 
occurs as a foreseen though unintended consequence of otherwise permissible 
activity.
137
 “Out of an abundance of caution,” however, Liberty Counsel suggested in 
a legal memorandum pertaining to Measure 26, that it would be “in favor of enabling 
legislation explicitly providing immunity to medical professionals who 
unintentionally caused the injury or death to the unborn child during treatment of the 
mother for an ectopic pregnancy or other life-threatening situations, as well as those 
                                                 
128 See infra Part IV. 
129 See Rob Mank, Doctors Call Mississippi “Personhood” Initiative Dangerous, CBS NEWS, 
Nov. 4, 2011, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57318625-503544/doctors-call-mississippi-
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HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/07/mississippi-
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abortion.html?pagewanted=all. 
132 Id.  
133 Id. 
134 MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15 (West 2011). 
135 Id. § 97-3-17. 
136 See Geroge S. Whitten, Jr. & Jameson Taylor,  Personhood Amendment Will Not Change 
Legal Safeguards for Physicians Providing Necessary Treatment to Pregnant Patients , MISS. CTR. 
FOR PUB. POL’Y, http://www.mspolicy.com/downloads/Initiative26Analysis.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 
2013).  
137 See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808 n.11 (1997) (noting that informed consent and the 
principle of double effect could be utilized by a state to permit palliative care specifically 
referencing terminal sedation “which may have the foreseen but unintended ‘double effect’ of 
hastening the patient’s death”). 
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involved with in vitro fertilization who do not recklessly or intentionally destroy 
living human beings.”138 
Of course, if the personhood amendments now being proposed are self-
executing, then no enabling legislation is needed. Since this means that the scope of, 
or exceptions to, the amendment would not need to be delineated by subsequent 
legislation, as a matter of immediacy, any limitations on the language should be 
included in the amendment itself. After the failure of Measure 26 then, Personhood 
USA went ahead and revised the language to include certain exceptions.
139
  
Specifically, the new language states that while “the intentional140 killing of any 
innocent person is prohibited . . . medical treatment for life threatening physical 
conditions intended to preserve life shall not be affected by this section,” where such 
medical treatment includes, but is not limited to, “treatment for cancer, ectopic and 
molar pregnancy, twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome, and placenta previa.”141 “Life-
threatening” is not defined in these revisions,142 which creates lingering questions. 
For instance, it is unclear whether termination of a pregnancy would be permissible 
if a woman with cancer could potentially survive without chemotherapy until the 
fetus became viable (followed by a Caesarian section, as suggested by Jennifer 
Mason).
143
 For purposes here, it is sufficient to note that personhood proponents 
have at least attempted to add some immediate protection for physicians treating 
pregnant women given that the amendment is intended to have an instant impact if 
passed.
144
 
It is also worth mentioning the concerns identified regarding women 
experiencing miscarriages. Under a personhood framework a miscarriage results in 
the death of a person, and normally, loss of human life is followed by an 
investigation into the cause, regardless of whether charges ultimately get filed.
145
 
Personhood proponents identified these concerns as the further use of scare tactics, 
and Dr. Freda Bush suggested that police would not have time for such “witch 
hunts.”146 Personhood USA’s poll did not indicate that investigation of miscarriages 
was a prominent reason for the defeat of Measure 26,
147
 but nevertheless, the new 
personhood language includes the statement that “spontaneous miscarriages shall not 
                                                 
138 Memorandum from Liberty Counsel, supra note 117, at 5. For more on IVF see infra Parts III 
and IV. 
139 See infra Appendix I. 
140 Intent is not defined. It may be that the amendment itself solely implicates situations where 
there is a “determination” to kill (specific intent), but in the criminal context in particular, general 
intent can take “the form of recklessness (involving actual awareness of a risk and the culpable taking 
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accompanying text. 
141 See infra Appendix I. 
142 See id. 
143  Grady, supra note 131. This issue received national attention recently when a pregnant 
teenager with leukemia in the Dominican Republic died after being denied chemotherapy. See, e.g., 
Raphael Romo, Dominican Republic Abortion Ban Stops Treatment for Pregnant Teen with Cancer, 
CNN (Jul. 25, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/25/world/americas/dominican-republic-abortion-
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144 See Whitten & Taylor, supra note 136.  
145 Will, Life and Law, supra note 93. 
146 Grady, supra note 131. 
147 See Ashley, supra note 100. 
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be affected by this section,” where “spontaneous miscarriage” is defined as “the 
unintentional termination of a pregnancy.”148  
Because miscarriage is here defined in terms of pregnancy, the revision may 
reflect the common understanding that naturally-occurring fertilization is generally 
undetectable until the implantation process is complete, which is commonly 
considered to mark the onset of pregnancy.
149
 This may suggest that there should be 
no investigation into the greater than fifty percent of fertilized ova that are naturally 
expelled from a woman prior to implantation,
150
 notwithstanding the fact that under 
a personhood framework, a human life has been lost.  
But beyond this, the revision does not address the normative problem, which is 
whether under a personhood framework, women known to be pregnant who 
experience miscarriages would (or ought) be investigated in connection with that 
loss of human life. After all, how would the intent with which the pregnancy was 
terminated be determined save for an investigation? A pregnant woman may look 
forward to parenthood, but may continue to take narcotics during pregnancy because 
she is addicted. Any miscarriage would appear to be unintentional (at least lacking 
specific intent), and perhaps spontaneous under the revised language. Or she may 
specifically intend that the drug use will lead to the termination of her pregnancy.  
Even if the authorities, after inquiry, plan to take her word regarding intent, an 
investigation would seem quite necessary. Importantly, whether such investigation 
would lead to a prosecution is a separate, but related question. 
The issue of drug use during pregnancy raises another problem with the revised 
language that I will identify here but leave for others to address.  Imagine a situation 
where a state has a statute that permits a woman to be prosecuted and sent to prison 
for twenty years if she has a miscarriage (even if unintentional) caused by drug 
use.
151
 Or consider Rennie Gibbs who, without regard to any personhood 
amendment, was charged in 2011 with depraved-heart murder in Mississippi
152
 when 
she experienced a stillbirth at thirty-six weeks gestation, and it was discovered that 
she had a cocaine habit.
153
 If these miscarriages were determined to be unintentional, 
would such prosecutions be permissible if a state constitutional provision provided 
that any unintentional termination of pregnancy is not prohibited by the amendment 
itself?  
It is unlikely that a drug-induced miscarriage would be considered acceptable by 
personhood proponents under the revised personhood language regardless of 
whether the woman intended for the pregnancy to terminate.
154
 In response to 
                                                 
148 See infra Appendix I. 
149 See Elizabeth Spahn & Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in 
Religion, Science, and Law, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 294 n.205 (1998).  
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the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that Ms. Gibbs would have to stand trial before the Court 
would determine whether the law applied to pregnant women. See Gibbs v. State, No. 2010-IA-00819-
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154 See Ada Calhoun, The Criminalization of Bad Mothers, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 25, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/magazine/the-criminalization-of-bad-
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Alabama’s chemical endangerment statute, Ben Dupré, the director of Personhood 
Alabama, was quoted as saying that “I think it would be unequal protection to give 
the woman a pass when anyone else who injects drugs into a child would be 
prosecuted.”155 One critic of Alabama’s statute suggested that it is a “personhood 
measure in disguise.”156  
Perhaps then, Personhood USA intends that while the amendments themselves 
may not be considered to prohibit unintentional miscarriages, existing statutes are 
available to prosecute women experiencing them.
157
 If that is the case, then the 
revised language addresses none of the issues raised in the Mississippi debates.  It is 
unexceptional that personhood proponents would not condone drug use by pregnant 
women, but what other activities should be considered problematic? If a physician 
tells a woman to refrain from certain activities while pregnant, but she engages in 
them anyway and experiences a miscarriage (regardless of intent), would those 
women be subject to investigation or prosecution under the existing statutory 
framework? If proponents are committed to the protection of the unborn, it is unclear 
why they would consider such investigations to be “witch hunts.” The revised 
personhood language does not appear to provide any protection in this regard, and 
raising the possibility of investigation into miscarriages may not be fear mongering 
or the use of scare tactics after all.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTRACEPTION AND/OR IN VITRO FERTILIZATION? 
In the weeks leading up to the vote in Mississippi, a great deal of attention (and 
confusion)
158
 surrounded what impact, if any, Measure 26 would have on 
contraception and/or IVF.
159
 Personhood opponents suggested that the amendment 
would outlaw contraception and IVF, while proponents fired back that anyone 
raising these concerns was simply engaging in fear mongering or the use of scare 
tactics.
160
 Neither claim was entirely accurate. With no certainty regarding the 
immediate impact of Measure 26 were it to have passed, assertions that the 
amendment would definitely outlaw contraception or IVF were not correct. 
Similarly, given the inconsistent statements made within the Personhood Movement 
                                                                                                                      
mothers.html?pagewanted=all (noting the relationship between chemical endangerment laws (like 
seen in Alabama that are used to prosecute pregnant drug users) and the Personhood Movement). The 
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caused to the preborn, see Brown, supra note 5, at 90-97. 
155 Pilkington, supra note 153.  
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157  In a recent interview Keith Mason maintained that claims made about miscarriages by 
opponents are ridiculous, but went on to note that “I know of cases where a woman that is addicted to 
crack will have her baby and the state will take the crack baby away because of child abuse and 
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158 See Borgmann, supra note 117, at 117 n.13. 
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regarding contraception and IVF,
161
 it was disingenuous for proponents of the 
amendment to claim that raising these concerns was simply resorting to scare tactics.  
With respect to those proponents claiming that Measure 26 would need enabling 
legislation, it was technically truthful, though perhaps misleading, for them to say 
that the amendment itself would not outlaw contraception or IVF.
162
 Misleading, 
because if the amendment passed, it would leave open the possibility that the 
subsequent enabling legislation would do just that. In fact, different proponents 
appeared to have different views about the potential and intended impact of the 
amendment on things like contraception and IVF.
163
  
It was clear that abortifacients like RU-486 that cause the embryo or fetus to 
detach from the uterine wall and then be expelled from the body
164
 would be 
problematic, as would emergency contraception (such as Plan B, the “morning after 
pill”)165 or intrauterine devices (IUDs) that are thought to prevent implantation of a 
fertilized egg, but views considering standard hormonal contraceptives became more 
opaque.
166
 Likewise, while proponents consistently maintained that unused pre-
embryos from an IVF cycle could not be discarded or destroyed, they were less 
transparent about their intent regarding specific aspects of the IVF process that 
create risk of harm to pre-embryos, like cryopreservation and the transfer process 
itself.
167
 Some personhood proponents will openly express discomfort with current 
IVF practices,
168
 but a Mississippi attorney and “Yes on 26” spokesman was 
adamant in his view that Measure 26 would not outlaw (or presumably significantly 
restrict) IVF.
169
 He publicly discussed his own two children conceived with the 
assistance of IVF, and stated that IVF would not be banned by the measure.
170
  
The revised personhood language attempts to put these issues to rest with two 
seemingly straightforward provisions. While “the intentional killing of any innocent 
person is prohibited,” (1) “only birth control that kills a person” and (2) “only in 
vitro fertilization and assisted reproduction that kills a person” are affected by the 
section.
171
 The remainder of this paper now turns to whether the concerns raised 
regarding contraception and IVF were legitimate (or just fear mongering), and 
whether the revised language used within the Personhood Movement addresses 
them.  
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IV. NEW LANGUAGE SAME CONCERNS REGARDING REPRODUCTIVE 
CHOICE 
Recall that Measure 26 defined “person” with reference to fertilization, cloning, 
or the functional equivalent thereof.
172
 Under the revised language the term is 
defined to apply “to every human being regardless of the method of creation,” where 
“human being” means “a member of the species [H]omo sapiens at any stage of 
development.”173 This change was likely a response to those who pointed out that the 
use of “fertilization” in Measure 26 was ambiguous, because it could refer to several 
different moments in the early reproductive process ranging from when the sperm 
penetrates the egg to successful implantation, which occurs as much as two weeks 
later.
174
  
Personhood USA is clear that it intends the rights and privileges associated with 
personhood to attach as early as possible in the reproductive process. On its website, 
instead of a reference to successful implantation, you find “[the zygote] formed by 
the union of an oocyte [egg] and a sperm [as] the beginning of the new human 
being.” 175  That said, “union of egg and sperm” is not the language used in the 
revised amendments; nor should it be for at least two reasons. First, we now know 
that the union of the genetic material in the egg and sperm itself is a process taking 
some 48-72 hours to complete.
176
 Within this time period, the sperm penetrates the 
egg, the maternal and paternal genetic material aligns, and then the new genome 
activates.
177
 Using the phrase “any stage of development” is presumably an attempt 
to select the earliest possible moment without the need to distinguish among these 
developmental landmarks. Indeed, some have argued that human development 
begins “when the egg and sperm have met.” 178  Second, the revised language 
continues to allow cloned human beings to be included in the definition of 
“person,”179 since the creation of a clone does not involve the union of an egg and 
sperm.
180
  
It is worth noting, though I will not belabor here, that the lack of reference to 
biological landmarks should not prove satisfying for those who believe that these 
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note 174, at 210 n.36. 
179 See supra Part II.  
180 The process of cloning, or somatic cell nuclear transfer, involves removing the nucleus of an 
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cells to divide. Elizabeth Price Foley, Human Cloning and the Right to Reproduce, 65 ALB. L. REV. 
625, 626 (2002). 
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distinctions are meaningful. Even if the rights and privileges associated with legal 
personhood are meant to attach at the very beginning of biological life as opposed 
to using some “thicker” conception of life181 we ought to be clear about when this 
“thin” notion of biological life actually begins. Importantly, personhood proponents 
are attempting to avoid the slippery slope involved in discussions about “potential 
life,” and when there is sufficient “potential” to be worthy of constitutional 
protection.
182
 But it is not clear from the revised language when development of a 
living member of the Homo sapiens species begins,
183
 and it would not seem 
appropriate to accord full constitutional protection to non-living members.  
For example, until genomic activation occurs, the pre-embryonic genome is 
dormant, as it lacks its own mitochondrial DNA (the cellular engine) to drive 
development.
184
 One could argue that until the genome has its own power source 
(via genomic activation the timing of which is still not well understood), we do not 
have a living member of the Homo sapiens species.
185
 Genomic activation could 
occur as late as the 100-cell stage (which would be several days after either the 
sperm penetrates the egg or re-nucleation).
186
 Therefore, making this distinction 
would have drastic impacts on the permissibility of certain activities within the IVF 
process, since no life would be lost unless occurring after genomic activation.
187
 In 
addition, for those who find meaning in the concept of individual genetic identity 
(numeric or otherwise) as it relates to defining members of the Homo sapiens 
species, further discussion could be had regarding genomic alignment, cell 
differentiation, and/or the process of twinning.
188
  
But for purposes here it will be assumed that the revised language intends for 
the rights and privileges of personhood to attach very shortly after the sperm 
penetrates the egg (or the egg is re-nucleated in the context of cloning); that is, 
within the first twenty-four hours, and prior to the first cellular cleavage.
189
 This is 
significant because the earlier in the reproductive process that rights attach, the 
greater the implications for reproductive choice.  
A. PERSONHOOD AND CONTRACEPTION 
The concern raised in regard to prior iterations of personhood measures was that 
birth control methods that are effective in preventing successful pregnancy after the 
sperm has penetrated the egg could be problematic, since “such birth control 
                                                 
181 See supra notes 2, 41-51 and accompanying text. 
182 See, e.g., Will et al., supra note 48; R. Albert Mohler, Jr., We’re All Harry Blackmun Now—
The Lessons of Mississippi, CHRISTIAN POST (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://www.christianpost.com/news/were-all-harry-blackmun-now-the-lessons-of-mississippi-62422/ 
(stating that “unless the unborn child is recognized as a person at every point in its development, we 
are just negotiating our own arbitrary definition of human personhood and human life”). 
183 See infra Appendix I. 
184 Peters, supra note 174, at 212. 
185 See id. at 227. 
186 Id. at 212-13. 
187 Id. at 218. 
188 See, e.g., id. at 218.; Will et al., supra note 48, at 39-40; COHEN, supra note 51, at 66-68. 
189 Peters, supra note 174, at 205-212. Arguably, the process of development begins as soon as 
the sperm attaches to the egg, since structural changes occur to both the sperm and egg to allow 
penetration and subsequent genomic alignment. Id. The Catholic Church appears to have settled on the 
fusion of the male and female gametes as the beginning of human life, which occurs many hours after 
the sperm penetrates the egg. Id. at 225. In the context of cloning, clinicians would have to stimulate 
the re-nucleated cell to initiate cellular division, whereas this process begins naturally when the sperm 
penetrates the egg. Id. at 205-212. 
596 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE VOL. 39 NO. 4 2013 
methods permit (or at least potentially permit) a person to come into existence, and 
then effectively and intentionally ensure that person’s ultimate demise.”190 It was 
clear in Mississippi that barrier forms of contraception like condoms and 
spermicides that prevent the sperm from reaching or penetrating the egg would not 
be implicated.
191
 On the other hand, personhood proponents openly condemned 
IUDs, emergency contraception, and RU-486, since each of these are thought to be 
effective after the sperm has penetrated the egg, either by preventing successful 
implantation of the fertilized ovum, or by causing the pregnancy to terminate after 
implantation has occurred.
192
 Up for debate was the intended (or potential) impact of 
personhood on hormonal contraceptives that are used by many women in the United 
States.
193
 
The revised language does nothing to clarify the stance of personhood 
proponents when it comes to hormonal contraception.
194
 Eliminating the word 
fertilization from the definition of “person” does not address the issue nor does 
inclusion of the statement that only birth control that “kills a person” is prohibited. 
When pressed, Keith Mason recently explained that he is “not opposed to 
contraception,” just “methods that “kill a living human being.” 195  But that is 
precisely the concern associated with hormonal contraceptives, which are effective 
by using the same mechanisms of operation utilized in what personhood proponents 
find clearly problematic emergency contraceptives like Plan B.
196
  
Just briefly, hormonal contraceptives (including emergency contraception)
197
 
have been thought to utilize multiple mechanisms of operation to prevent pregnancy: 
                                                 
190 Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 67. 
191 Id. at 66 n.16. 
192 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Briefing: Conscience Clauses and Conscientious Refusal , 21 J. 
CLINICAL ETHICS, 163, 166 (2010). 
193 A 2010 study performed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) showed 
that through 2008, hormonal contraceptives (including the “pill,” patches, implants, injections, and 
vaginal rings), were by far the most common form of non-permanent birth control used by women, 
with the pill clearly being the most dominant. Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, Use of 
Contraception in the United States: 1982-2008, 23 VITAL & HEALTH STATS. 29 (Aug. 2010), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_029.pdf; see also CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE 
UNITED STATES, GUTTMACHER INST. (Aug. 2013), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_contr_use.html. 
194 See infra Appendix I. 
195 Pesta, supra note 41. The enabling legislation that was to accompany the recently proposed 
constitutional amendment in North Dakota similarly would have outlawed “birth control that can be 
clinically proven to kill a person,” and the state department of health was tasked with providing a list 
of any such forms of contraception. See S.B. 2302, 63d Legis. Assemb., § 2(2)(a) (N.D. 2013), 
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-8231-
02000.pdf?20130213153739. But given the current status of our clinical understanding of the post-
fertilization effects of certain forms of birth control, it is unclear what that list might have looked like. 
See infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. 
196 See, e.g., Rachel White-Domain, Making Rules and Unmaking Choice: Federal Conscience 
Clauses, the Provider Conscience Regulation and the War on Reproductive Freedom , 59 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 1249, 1260 (2010). 
197 There are different types of hormonal contraception and emergency contraception.  The most 
common types of hormonal contraception are combined pills (“COCs,” which contain both estrogen 
and progesterone), and progesterone-only pills (POPs). See, e.g., Walter L. Larimore, M.D., Growing 
Debate About the Abortifacient Effect of the Birth Control Pill and the Principle of Double Effect, 16 
ETHICS & MED. 23 (2000), available at http://www.epm.org/resources/2004/Oct/01/growing-debate-
about-abortifacient-effect-birth-co/. Emergency contraception may involve the Yuzpe method (taking 
larger doses of daily oral contraceptive pills), or Plan B (a regimen of two doses of levonorgestrel 
taken twelve hours apart). Spreng, supra note 164, at 224-26. In addition, the FDA recently approved 
“Plan B One-Step,” which involves a single dose of lovenorgestrel, and ulipristal acetate -based EC 
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(1) preventing ovulation as an initial matter by suppressing pituitary gonadotropin 
secretion, which is the mechanism operative most of the time; (2) altering cervical 
mucus to limit sperm penetration; (3) altering the endometrium (uterine lining) and 
fallopian tube to impede sperm travel; and (4) altering the endometrium rendering it 
inhospitable to successful implantation.
198
 A woman who avoids pregnancy by 
taking hormonal contraception will not know which of these mechanisms worked.
199
 
The pill (morning-after or standard) may have failed to prevent ovulation and failed 
to prevent the sperm from penetrating the egg, but nonetheless succeeded in 
preventing the fertilized ovum from implanting, which would lead to the death of 
this newly recognized person.
200
  
Importantly, the true post-fertilization impact of hormonal contraceptives, 
including emergency contraceptives, is still hotly debated.
201
 To the extent these 
methods are found to be only effective prior to the sperm penetrating the egg, 
personhood ought to have no impact on the permissibility of such contraceptives. 
But assuming that these methods can be effective in preventing successful pregnancy 
post-fertilization (by preventing intrauterine implantation and/or causing a 
miscarriage), perhaps the most forthright response regarding personhood’s intended 
impact comes from Bill Fortenberry, a prominent personhood advocate in 
Alabama.
202
  
In his article Personhood and the Pill, Fortenberry wrote that to the extent 
hormonal contraception has an abortifacient effect, it would be banned by a 
personhood amendment.
203
 He discussed research addressing whether hormonal 
contraception has such an effect, including one study that showed that twenty-one 
out of twenty-five women who became pregnant while on an oral hormonal 
contraceptive subsequently miscarried, which is twice the miscarriage rate for 
women not on the pill.
204
  
                                                                                                                      
(ella), which is effective up to 120 hours after intercourse. MARK R. WICCLAIR, CONSCIENTIOUS 
OBJECTION IN HEALTH CARE 22 (2011).  
198 Walter L. Larimore, M.D. & Joseph B. Stanford, M.D., Postfertilization Effects of Oral 
Contraceptives and Their Relationship to Informed Consent, 9 ARCH. FAM. MED. 126, 127-29 (2000).  
199 Id. 
200  Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 69. Dr. Larimore notes that POPs and Norplant (a 
subcutaneously implanted progesterone rod) are more likely to be effective post -fertilization than 
COCs. Larimore, supra note 197. Indeed, some opponents to the “hostile endometrium theory” argue 
that the level of progesterone in COCs is too low to have the post-fertilization impact suggested, 
particularly given the changed hormonal environment that would exist if break-through ovulation 
should occur. Id. 
201 See Spreng, supra note 164, at 223; Michelle Castillo, Investigation Reveals Morning-After 
Pill May Not Prevent Implantation, CBS NEWS (June 7, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
504763_162-57448998-10391704/investigation-reveals-morning-after-pill-may-not-prevent-
implantation/. Drs. Larimore and Stanford, on the other hand, cite to studies showing that hormonal 
contraception can alter the endometrium in a fashion that decreases the likelihood of successful intra -
uterine implantation. Larimore & Stanford, supra note 198, at 128-29 (noting that hormonal 
contraceptives reduce the thickness of the endometrium, alter integrin expression, and also potentially 
increase the risk of extra-uterine implantation, such as ectopic pregnancies). Several studies have 
indicated that the risk of ectopic pregnancy is higher for women using POPs. Id. at 129. Dr. Larimore 
acknowledges, however, that there are opponents to the “hostile endometrium theory,” and he admits 
that little direct evidence exists for the true post-fertilization impacts of hormonal contraception. 
Larimore, supra note 197. 
202  See Bill Fortenberry, Personhood and the Pill, PERSONHOOD INITIATIVE, available at 
http://www.personhoodinitiative.com/personhood-and-the-pill.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
203 Id. 
204 Id. Note that this is different from the question of which mechanism of operation makes the 
birth control method effective in preventing pregnancy. Here we are talking about the failure of the 
birth control to prevent pregnancy (successful implantation), yet nonetheless causing a subsequent 
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Given the increased likelihood demonstrated in the study for hormonal 
contraception to lead to miscarriage (and the death of a person), Fortenberry 
explicitly concluded that the “Personhood Initiative will continue to advocate for a 
ban of any form of birth control that can be proven to cause the deaths of innocent 
children.” 205  While Mason can appear evasive when asked about contraception, 
Fortenberry’s position is clearly consistent with the goal of the Personhood 
Movement to protect all innocent persons, where personhood is considered to attach 
within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm penetrates the egg. Following the 
loss in Mississippi, one personhood advocate who expressly believes that the 
personhood movement would outlaw any type birth control that permits the 
fertilization of the egg noted that, in voting down the amendment, some 
conservatives demonstrated that they “are not really so pro-life as [they] think.”206 
The relationship between pre-embryonic personhood and contraception can also 
be seen in the debates surrounding conscience clause legislation in the healthcare 
context.
207
 These laws permit service providers and institutions to deny providing 
medical services on the basis of conscientious objection, and suggest that certain 
forms of birth control could be at risk of significant regulation under a personhood 
framework, even if the legislation or amendments that pass do not specifically 
impose them.
208
  
At the federal level, in 2008 the Bush Administration pushed the Provider 
Conscience Regulation (PCR) in order to protect providers who refuse to perform 
certain actions based on conscience.
 209
 The PCR attempted to define abortion
210
 “to 
include any action that prevents the implantation of a fertilized egg, effectively 
including the birth control pill, other hormonal contraceptives and the intrauterine 
device.”211 The Obama Administration rescinded most of the PCR in 2011,212 but 
                                                                                                                      
miscarriage. It is the increased risk of miscarriage that Fortenberry is identifying as being 
problematic. In other words, when the pill is successful (operating pre-fertilization), it may not be 
problematic under a personhood framework; however, it would still be problematic given the risk that 
the pill will fail to prevent pregnancy, yet nonetheless lead to miscarriage. Id. 
205 Id. 
206  Mohler, supra note 182. One survey suggested that the majority of American Catholics 
disagree with the Church’s prohibitions on contraception. Elizabeth Sepper, Not Only the Doctor’s 
Dilemma: The Complexity of Conscience in Medicine, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 385, 399-400 (2013) 
(citing CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, IN GOOD CONSCIENCE: RESPECTING THE BELIEFS OF HEALTHCARE 
PROVIDERS AND THE NEEDS OF PATIENTS 10 (2010)). 
207  For a comprehensive discussion of laws regarding freedom of conscience, see Nadia N. 
Sawicki, The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience , 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1389 (2012); for a 
discussion of the relationship between the Personhood Movement and conscience legislation, see 
Jonathan F. Will, Conscience Legislation, the Personhood Movement, and Access to Emergency 
Contraception, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 411 (2013) [hereinafter Will, Conscience Legislation]. 
208 See, e.g., Sawicki, supra note 207; Will, Conscience Legislation, supra note 207.  
209 White-Domain, supra note 196, at 1250 n.13 (identifying the full name of the regulation as 
“Ensuring That Department of Health and Human Services Funds Do Not Support  Coercive or 
Discriminatory Policies or Practices in Violation of Federal Law ,” which was located at 45 C.F.R.      
§ 88 (2008) (rescinded by Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider 
Conscience Protection Laws, 76 Fed. Reg. 9968-02 (Feb. 23, 2011)). 
210 The earliest conscience laws, like the Church Amendment, concerned abortion, and were 
enacted shortly after Roe v. Wade. See Pope, supra note 192, at 164. 
211Adam Sonfield, Proposed ‘Conscience’ Regulation Opposed Widely as Threat to Reproductive 
Health and Beyond, 11 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/11/4/gpr110417.html.  
212 Regulation for the Enforcement of Federal Health Care Provider Conscience Protection Laws, 
76 Fed. Reg. at 9968-02; see also Rob Stein, Obama Administration Replaces Controversial 
“Conscience” Regulation for Health Care Workers, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021807443.html.  
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recently proposed federal legislation would have offered even broader protection for 
conscientious objection,
213
 and individual states have also taken up this cause.
214
  
Although conscientious objection to abortion has long been protected by most 
states, by the mid-2000s, states increasingly began to acknowledge objections to the 
provision of emergency contraception.
215
 Some states have expanded their 
conscientious objection protection in a way that would include any form of 
contraception.
216
 The Guttmacher Institute reports that as of August 2012 there are 
fourteen states that allow some healthcare providers to refuse to provide 
contraception, and six states explicitly permit pharmacists to refuse to dispense 
contraceptives.
217
 Mississippi was actually the first state to broadly permit 
pharmacists to deny the provision of contraceptives,
218
 and more recently, Missouri 
attempted to pass a bill that would have permitted employers and insurance 
providers to deny coverage for contraceptives.
219
 
There are clearly those who find certain forms of contraception problematic, and 
conscience legislation serves to protect that individual (or institutional) belief. But 
properly understood, the adoption of a personhood framework could be viewed to 
represent a state-wide (at least majoritarian) acceptance of the principles upon which 
these birth control methods are condemned.
220
 Given the stated goal of the 
Personhood Movement to recognize and protect pre-embryonic human life,
221
 even if 
the measure itself did not immediately outlaw certain forms of birth control, if 
proponents seek to remain consistent with the position, it is entirely possible that 
they would push for their given state to regulate contraception more heavily in an 
effort to offer protection to these newly recognized persons.  
There are personhood advocates who support an outright ban on certain forms of 
contraception as a means to protect pre-embryonic persons from those 
contraceptives that could potentially cause their death.
222
 But even if we take the 
                                                 
213 Sepper, supra note 206, at 386 (discussing the Respect for Rights of Conscience Act, S. 1467, 
112th Cong., (2011-2012), a law “that would have permitted any person or entity to refuse to provide 
any care even if the refusal results in a person’s death”).  
214 Pope, supra note 192, at 165. 
215 Id. at 164. 
216 Id. at 166. 
217 See Will, Conscience Legislation, supra note 207, at 416 (citing STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: 
REFUSING TO PROVIDE HEALTH SERVICES, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 2013), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RPHS.pdf (identifying the six states as Arizona, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Mississippi, and South Dakota)).  
218 Brittany L. Grimes, The Plan B for Plan B: The New Dual Over-the-Counter and Prescription 
Status of Plan B and Its Impact Upon Pharmacists, Consumers, and Conscience Clauses, 41 GA. L. 
REV. 1395, 1402 (2007) (citing Mary K. Collins, Conscience Clauses and Oral Contraceptives: 
Conscientious Objection or Calculated Obstruction?, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 37, 49 (2006)). In fact, 
the Mississippi statute permits conscientious objection by any person “who furnishes, or assists in the 
furnishing of” healthcare services, which is a term broadly defined to include “patient referral, 
counseling, therapy, testing, diagnosis or prognosis, research, instruction, prescribing, dispensing or 
administering any device, drug, or medication, surgery, or any other care or treatment .” See MISS. 
CODE ANN. § 41-107-3, § 41-107-5 (West 2009).  
219 See Kevin Murphy, Missouri Law to Deny Birth Control Coverage Vetoed, REUTERS (Jul. 12, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/12/us-usa-contraception-missouri-
idUSBRE86B1B620120712. 
220  Will, Conscience Legislation, supra note 207, at 412 (highlighting Professor Sepper’s 
suggestion that “a possible purpose behind conscience legislation is to ‘make abortions, family 
planning, and end-of-life care more difficult to obtain,’ and that the true goal of such legislation is 
‘hostility to reproductive health and patients’ interests.’” Sepper, supra note 206, at 406). 
221 See About Personhood, supra note 31. 
222  In a subsequent paper, I will discuss the constitutionality of any proposed restriction on 
hormonal contraceptives, but briefly, while Supreme Court precedent establishes that a state could not 
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position that these forms of contraception carry the risk of causing death to a person, 
it does not necessarily follow that these forms of birth control must be banned. After 
all, the Constitution is currently interpreted to permit capital punishment, so it 
cannot be said that human life must always be protected.
223
 Perhaps to account for 
this, the revised personhood language only purports to protect “innocent” persons.224 
Even still, there are many activities that are perfectly permissible notwithstanding 
the fact that they involve a significant risk of loss of innocent human life.
225
  
For instance, in 2012 the United States Census Bureau reported statistics 
showing that nearly 34,000 people died in 2009 from motor vehicle accidents.
226
 
While adults can surely make an autonomous decision to assume this risk, the many 
children under the age of fifteen who died in accidents
227
 did not make that choice. 
Because we permit adults to subject children to this known risk of loss of innocent 
human life, risk of loss of life alone does not seem sufficient to support an outright 
ban on an activity. By analogy, a parent driving her child hopes to arrive at her 
destination without having a car accident, though she is certainly aware of the risk 
that an accident will occur and that her child might die. Similarly, a woman using 
hormonal contraception may hope to avoid pregnancy without fertilization taking 
place, though she remains aware of the risk that pregnancy is avoided only after a 
person comes into existence and then dies when implantation fails or is disrupted. In 
either case, at the time the decision is made (to drive or use hormonal contraception), 
the woman does not know whether a death will result, and indeed, it would be very 
difficult to predict the likelihood that a death would result. 
As a society, a decision has been made that it is acceptable for a certain number 
of lives to be lost (innocent or otherwise) in exchange for the convenience of motor 
vehicle transportation. Of course, the states regulate such transportation to make it as 
safe as possible. Few would question the convenience that comes with the ability to 
use contraception the question would be, at what cost? Rather than immediately 
imposing an outright ban on forms of contraception that create a risk of loss of pre-
embryonic life, we ought to ask what level of risk is acceptable, and what level of 
regulation is necessary to achieve it. The Guttmacher Institute recently reported that 
when used properly, the pill prevents pregnancy over ninety-nine percent of the 
time; however, it is not clear what proportion of that ninety-nine percent involved 
the death of a pre-embryonic person.
228
 This information would be relevant to 
properly make the assessment suggested here.
229
 Regardless of the result of such an 
                                                                                                                      
outlaw all forms of contraception, it is far less clear whether certain forms of contraception could be 
restricted given a state’s (compelling?) interest in protecting pre-embryonic persons following 
adoption of a personhood framework. Cohen, supra note 15, at 1167-72; Mark Strasser, The Next 
Battleground? Personhood, Privacy, and Assisted Reproductive Technologies , 65 OKLA. L. REV. 177, 
198-99 (2013); Will, Measure 26, supra note 81, at 74. 
223 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 741 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
224 See infra Appendix I. 
225  See, e.g., Dylan P. Kletter, Negligence in the (Thin) Air: Understanding the Legal 
Relationship Between Outfitters and Participants in High Risk Expeditions Through Analysis of the 
1996 Mount Everest Tragedy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 769, 784 (2008) (noting that a mountain climber may 
choose to participate in a particular climb because of the likelihood of death).  
226 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FATAL MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS—NATIONAL SUMMARY: 1990-
2009, at 694 tbl.1105 (2012), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1105.pdf.  
227 The census data included a finding that 6.88 minors under the age of 15 died in vehicular 
accidents per 100,000 residents. Id.  
228 See GUTTMACHER, supra note 193.  
229 One could also argue that the high rate of natural miscarriage (leading to the death of pre -
embryonic persons) should lead to restrictions on unprotected sex itself. But personhood proponents 
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inquiry, it cannot be said to be fear mongering to discuss the potential impacts of 
pre-embryonic personhood on contraception, and the types of restrictions
230
 that 
might follow if such a framework is adopted.  
B. PERSONHOOD AND IN VITRO FERTILIZATION  
Like contraception, debates surrounding Measure 26 in Mississippi revealed 
questions about whether passage of the amendment would outlaw IVF. As noted, the 
revised personhood language states that “only in vitro fertilization and assisted 
reproduction that kills a person” are affected.231 But if proponents are serious about 
extending the rights of legal personhood to pre-embryos, then protecting these 
persons from serious injury should also be a priority. Given the inherent risks to pre-
embryos associated with IVF, there should be real concern that significant 
restrictions would result from the passage of a personhood measure either from the 
amendment itself or from subsequent legislation.
232
 Keith Mason has suggested that 
while personhood may not necessarily “ban” IVF, he would like to see it 
“reformed.”233 The question is how. 
If a personhood framework is established utilizing the revised language, it is not 
clear what aspects of IVF would be immediately problematic, or might be subject to 
future restriction. In one of the few cases to consider the status of pre-embryos 
created in the IVF process, the court in Davis v. Davis suggested that if pre-embryos 
were afforded “the legal status of ‘persons’ . . . vested . . . with legally cognizable 
interests separate from those of their progenitors, [s]uch a decision would doubtless 
have had the effect of outlawing IVF programs in the [S]tate of Tennessee.”234 Of 
particular importance here, the Davis Court explored Tennessee’s public policies 
regarding the treatment of pre-embryos (as gleaned from the legal treatment of 
fetuses), and determined that pre-embryos “[could] not be considered ‘persons’ 
under Tennessee law.”235 Affording this consideration to pre-embryos is, of course, 
the very purpose of the Personhood Movement.  
For the same reasons mentioned in the context of contraception, I am not 
convinced that adoption of a personhood framework would require IVF to be 
expressly outlawed. Nevertheless, several of the procedures that are available within 
the process, such as pre-embryo selection, cryopreservation, pre-implantation 
genetic screening (PGS), and even the transfer process itself, pose significant risk of 
injury or destruction to the pre-embryos involved.
236
 The following section will 
                                                                                                                      
do not appear to be arguing for such restrictions, and the idea of the government regulating sexual 
activity itself (as opposed to the types of contraception or ART available) raises a host of 
constitutional problems that are beyond the scope of this project. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 558 (2003) (finding a Texas statute that criminalized certain sexual behavior between members 
of the same sex to violate the Due Process Clause); see infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text for 
discussion of this issue in the context of IVF. 
230 In Germany and Italy, for instance, regulations limit the number of pre-embryos that may be 
created and transferred for implantation to reduce the risk of loss in the IVF process. See infra notes 
273-274 and accompanying text. 
231 See infra Appendix I.  
232 Even if the amendment itself does not implicate injury caused to pre-embryos, it is possible 
that other statutory provisions would be available to address such harms. See supra notes 151-57 and 
accompanying text (discussing unintentional drug-induced miscarriages). 
233 Kounang, supra note 17; Pesta, supra note 41. 
234 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tenn. 1992). 
235 Id. at 594-95. 
236 See Bridget M. Fuselier, The Trouble With Putting All of Your Eggs in One Basket: Using a 
Property Rights Model to Resolve Disputes Over Cryopreserved Pre-Embryos, 14 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 
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discuss the risks associated with these procedures, and the types of restrictions on 
the practice of IVF that might be expected under a personhood framework.
237
 Even 
without an outright ban on IVF, such restrictions could be stringent enough to make 
it effectively impossible for these reproductive services to be provided.  
1. Pre-Embryo Creation, Selection, and Cryopreservation 
In order for pre-embryos to be created, the male and female gametes (sperm and 
ova) must be retrieved.
238
 The process for obtaining ova (or oocytes) is significantly 
more “onerous, painful, and risky than acquiring sperm,” 239  and it is also very 
expensive.
240
 The woman from whom ova will be retrieved must undergo daily 
injections of hormones to stimulate her ovaries to produce mature oocytes, which are 
then extracted laparoscopically using a needle guided by ultrasound.
241
 Clinicians 
attempt to retrieve as many ova as possible, not just because of the cost and burden 
of the retrieval process, but also to increase the chances of successful fertilization 
and development.
242
 In addition, clinicians will typically attempt to fertilize each of 
the ova retrieved, due to the low success rate historically associated with the 
cryopreservation of unfertilized ova.
243
  
During the first forty hours following introduction of the sperm to the ovum, an 
inspection is performed to determine whether cellular division has commenced.
244
 
Clinicians visually inspect the form and structure (morphology) of the pre-embryos 
in order to select those of the highest quality
245
 for immediate use in implantation.
246
 
The “least robust” pre-embryos identified through this visual inspection are typically 
discarded, and sufficiently robust, though perhaps not the best pre-embryos that 
exceed the number to be immediately implanted are commonly cryopreserved.
247
 
                                                                                                                      
143, 146 (2009); Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation 
Genetic Screening, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 292-93 n.37 (2008). 
237 In a subsequent paper, I will explore the constitutionality of any such restrictions. See supra 
note 23.  
238 Fuselier, supra note 236, at 146. 
239 Id. 
240 Many fertility clinics do not itemize the various costs associated with an IVF cycle on their 
websites, but at least two clinics advertised egg retrieval costs that alone exceed $2,000. Sample IVF 
Costs, REPROD. HEALTH CTR. (2012), http://www.ivftucson.com/financial-information/sample-ivf-
costs; Fertility, QUILLEN ETSU PHYSICIANS (2012), http://www.etsuphysicians.com/medical-
services/fertility.html (select “What are my costs?” from the left-hand panel).  
241 Fuselier, supra note 236, at 146-47. 
242 Id. at 146 n.20. 
243 Id. at 147. As will be discussed, research involving the cryopreservation of ova (as opposed to 
pre-embryos) is ongoing, and may offer an alternative that would seem more permissible under a 
personhood framework. 
244 Id. at 144. 
245  See, e.g., Meredith A. Reynolds et al., Risk of Multiple Birth Associated with In Vitro 
Fertilization Using Donor Eggs, 154 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1043, 1044 (2001). This visual inspection 
is to be distinguished from the genetic testing associated with PGS. 
246  Maureen Wood, Embryo Freezing: Is it Safe?, IVF.NET (Aug. 2, 2004), 
http://www.ivf.net/ivf/embryo-freezing-is-it-safe-o335.html (noting that the “best” pre-embryos are 
selected for fresh IVF cycles, as opposed to cryopreserving the best pre-embryos). Even where 
successful pregnancy and birth is achieved through IVF, because of a lack of studies (and the fact that 
symptoms may not appear for years), it is not well understood whether potential genetic abnormalities 
or defects may be caused by the IVF process. See Gina Kolata, Picture Emerging on Genetic Risks of 
IVF, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/health/17ivf.html?_r=1&nl=8hlth&emc=hlthal . Further 
understanding of these issues could lead to restrictions on the practice of IVF without regard to 
personhood. 
247 Peters, supra note 174, at 217. 
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Under a personhood framework the visual inspection and discarding of pre-embryos 
could be problematic, as could cryopreservation.  
If personhood attaches within the first twenty-four hours after the sperm 
penetrates the egg, then a person would exist at the time the visual inspection is 
made. Proponents may seek to impose restrictions on the techniques and protocol 
used by clinicians to determine whether a given pre-embryonic person is fit for 
implantation. For instance, it is possible that cellular division fails to initiate or that 
otherwise very little development occurs after the sperm penetrates the egg.
248
 In this 
situation personhood proponents might agree that the pre-embryonic person is not 
alive (or no longer alive?),
249
 though they may still call for compassionate 
treatment
250
 of this deceased person.  
On the other hand, cellular division may begin, but the morphology of the pre-
embryo may suggest that development is abnormal and unlikely to result in 
successful implantation or pregnancy. Given the stated goal of protecting all life, 
without exception,
251
 proponents would likely be uncomfortable with clinicians 
discarding living, though abnormal, pre-embryonic persons based on visual 
inspection. Under a personhood framework, it could be mandated that these pre-
embryos either be transferred into the woman (and thus, at least given a chance at 
continued development,
252
 as opposed to the certain death that discarding would 
bring), or that they be cryopreserved.
253
 While cryopreservation offers many 
benefits, it also presents its own problems.
254
  
Cryopreservation is a routine part of the IVF process,
255
 and it typically takes 
place when the pre-embryo is in the four- to eight-cell stage.
256
 The existence of 
cryopreservation as an available option reduces the number of egg extractions a 
woman must undergo, and allows clinicians to transfer a smaller number of pre-
                                                 
248 See Fuselier, supra note 236, at 144. 
249 The awkwardness of using the language of “life” and “person” in this context highlights the 
deficiencies associated with ignoring the biological realities of the early reproductive process 
previously discussed. Under Louisiana law pre-embryos are recognized as juridical persons; however, 
if the fertilized ovum fails to develop (other than due to cryopreservation), it is considered nonviable, 
and not a juridical person. LA REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2008). Similarly, a statute was recently 
proposed in Georgia that would have identified pre-embryos as human beings, but also included the 
statement that a pre-embryo that “fails to show any sign of life over a 36 hour period outside a state of 
cryopreservation shall be considered no longer living.” S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
2009), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf (emphasis added). 
250  Even a national infertility organization that opposes personhood initiatives advises those 
undergoing IVF to inquire as to the options available for any pre-embryos (unfit or otherwise) not 
transferred to the woman’s uterus. One option listed is a “disposal ceremony,” designed to create “a 
special moment to come to closure regarding the [pre-]embryos.” After IVF: The Embryo Decision, 
RESOLVE: NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N (2013), http://www.resolve.org/family-building-options/donor-
options/after-ivf-the-embryo-decision.html. 
251 About Personhood, supra note 31. 
252  We might question whether attempted implantation would be appropriate in these 
circumstances. Under a personhood framework, this abnormal pre-embryo would possess the same 
legal and moral status as you or I do. If clinicians determine that this pre-embryo has a very low 
probability of surviving the implantation process, then what justi fication would there be for sending 
this person we are trying to protect off to near certain death? Would it not be better to cryopreserve 
the pre-embryo in the hopes that one day technology would improve the odds of successful 
implantation and pregnancy? See infra notes 339-52 and accompanying text for further discussion of 
the risks associated with the transfer process.  
253 See, e.g., Personhood Doesn’t Ban IVF, a Response to Atlee Breland, PERSONHOOD USA 
(2013), http://www.personhoodusa.com/blog/personhood-doesnt-ban-ivf-response-atlee-breland/. 
254 See, e.g., Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147. 
255 Wood, supra note 246. 
256 Peters, supra note 174, at 217. 
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embryos into a woman in a given cycle (thereby reducing the risk of multiple births), 
because excess pre-embryos can be saved for later use.
257
 But the cryopreservation 
process also presents risk of injury or destruction to the pre-embryonic persons 
involved, which stems from the freezing and thawing processes, as well as the state 
and duration of being frozen.
258
  
In order to survive the freezing process, pre-embryos must “withstand 
potentially lethal ice formation, transmembrane water movement and extreme 
changes in external electrolyte concentrations, temperature and pH.”259 Then they 
must survive the reversal of these conditions associated with the thawing process.
260
 
While it is theoretically possible to keep pre-embryos frozen indefinitely, it is 
unclear whether, after a certain period of time, the pre-embryos become unsuitable 
for implantation.
261
 In 2010 there was a successful birth resulting from the use of a 
pre-embryo that had been frozen for nearly twenty years; though it is worth noting 
that there were originally five such pre-embryos: only two survived the thawing 
process and were implanted, and only one resulted in a live birth.
262
 In other words, 
eighty percent of the pre-embryonic persons involved died in the process, which may 
not be considered a success story. 
The survival rates for cryopreserved pre-embryos vary from clinic to clinic with 
anywhere from 20-40% not surviving the freezing and thawing process.
 263
 In 
addition, at least some studies have shown that successful pregnancies are less likely 
to occur when using thawed as opposed to fresh pre-embryos,
264
 and unsuccessful 
implantation obviously leads to the death of the pre-embryonic person involved. 
Further, the risks associated with cryopreservation are not limited to survival of the 
pre-embryo or suitability for implantation.
265
 We are only just beginning to study the 
question of whether freezing can cause genetic modification and/or defects, some of 
which may not be expressed until years after birth.
266
  
This data would clearly be relevant in assessing whether cryopreservation poses 
an unacceptable risk of death or injury to pre-embryonic persons. In the meantime, 
knowledge of these risks could very realistically lead to restrictions on the use of 
cryopreservation under a personhood framework. After all, once we’ve identified a 
pre-embryonic person, decisions made (or regulations imposed) regarding that 
                                                 
257 Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147. 
258 Id. 
259 Wood, supra note 246. 
260 Id. 
261 Whether cryopreserved persons are “alive” as opposed to being in some sort of limbo, or 
whether they are (or ought to be) entitled to the same legal rights and protections as “thawed” persons 
are also interesting questions.  
262 Cynthia S. Marietta, Birth of Healthy Baby from 20-Year-Old Frozen Embryo Raises Ethical 
Questions, UNIV. HOUS. LAW CTR. 1, 1-2 (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.law.uh.edu/healthlaw/perspectives/2011/(CM)%20IVF.pdf. 
263 Wood, supra note 246. See Marietta, supra note 262.  
264  Wood, supra note 246. The data reported by the CDC indicate that, as a percentage of 
transfers resulting in live birth, fresh transfers are more successful for women under the age forty, but 
less successful than thawed transfers for women forty-one and older. See Assisted Reproductive 
Technology (ART) Report, CTRS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2010), 
http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/art/Apps/NationalSummaryReport.aspx .  
265 See Marietta, supra note 262, at 3-4 (explaining that the combination of freezing/thawing 
techniques could potentially pose medical risks to resulting children).  
266 See, e.g., id. (describing recent work performed by the Jones Institute, a preeminent IVF 
research institute in Norfolk, Virginia, and generally noting the limited number of studies conducted 
regarding IVF-conceived children); see also Gina Kolata, Picture Emerging on Genetic Risks of IVF, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/17/health/17ivf.html?_r=1&nl=8hlth&emc=hlthal. 
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person including whether it is permissible to subject the person to 
cryopreservation
267
can fairly be scrutinized using a best interests standard.
268
 
While this is certainly true with respect to activities potentially resulting in the death 
of these persons who would have a constitutionally protected right to life, it can be 
more complicated when discussing the permissibility of genetic interventions that 
might be said to harm the pre-embryonic persons involved. The best interests 
standard seems appropriate, assuming (rightly or wrongly), as I believe personhood 
proponents would, that any genetic intervention that impacts pre-embryonic persons, 
though does not bring about death, would be identity-preserving.
269
 In other words, 
that any genetic damage that might occur as a result of cryopreservation would not 
change the identity of the pre-embryonic person involved, and thus we can say that 
harm involved has occurred to a presently-existing (not future, as-yet unidentified) 
person.
270
 
As a result, it may be mandated that pre-embryos in a current state of 
cryopreservation remain frozen until the thawing technique becomes safer.  Further, 
future cryopreservation of pre-embryonic persons could be outlawed entirely, with 
fertility clinics permitted to fertilize only those ova that will be immediately 
implanted. In Italy, cryopreservation of pre-embryos is expressly prohibited because 
“it constitutes an offence against the respect due to human beings . . . .”271 Clinicians 
may fertilize no more than three ova in a given cycle, and each pre-embryo created 
must be transferred, regardless of its health status.
272
 While not expressly outlawing 
cryopreservation, Germany’s Embryo Protection Act makes it a crime to attempt to 
fertilize more ova than may be transferred in one cycle, and permits no more than 
three pre-embryos to be transferred.
273
  
                                                 
267 This argument is equally applicable to any harm that might occur as a result of PGS, which is 
discussed below. 
268 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that after the trial judge 
determined that the pre-embryos should be treated as “children in vitro,” the judge “ then invoked the 
doctrine of parens patriae and held that it was ‘in the best interest of the children’ to be born rather 
than destroyed”); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:131 (2012) (stating that “in disputes arising 
between any parties regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such 
disputes is to be in the best interests of the in vitro fertilized ovum”).  
269 See infra note 299.  
270 See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 423 (2012); I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187 (2012) (In 
a two-article series, Cohen arguing that the best interests standard, utilized to protect existing 
children, does not seem satisfying as a justification for restricting reproductive choices that might 
impact future children.). For instance, in arguing against potential restrictions on say the elderly 
having access to IVF, Professor Cohen uses Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem to note that assuming the 
resulting child would have a life worth living, such child cannot be said to be harmed by permitting 
the elderly person to undergo IVF, since the alternative would be no life at all.  See DEREK PARFIT, 
REASONS AND PERSONS 358-61 (1984). Assuming that the genetic interventions I discuss in this paper 
are identity-preserving, Professor Cohen’s argument against the use of the best interests standard 
would not be implicated, since the pre-embryonic persons involved are already in existence and thus, 
we are not speaking about harming future persons. See infra note 299 for additional discussion of this 
issue. 
271 Jeffrey T. Wise, Comment, Embryo Banking as a Novel Option for the Infertile? Law, Policy, 
and a Proposed Model Act, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 163, 181 (2007) (citing Rachel Anne 
Fenton, Catholic Doctrine Versus Women’s Rights: The New Italian Law on Assisted Reproduction , 
14 MED. L. REV. 73, 98 (2006)). 
272 Id. 
273 Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG][The Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, 
BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 (Ger.), translation available at 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf . 
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Recent personhood efforts in the State of Georgia at the legislative level are also 
informative.
274
 In 2009 the organization Georgia Right to Life helped to draft a bill 
that would have offered legal protection
275
 to pre-embryos as “biological human 
being[s] who [are] not the property of any person or entity.”276 As introduced to the 
Senate, the bill would have effectively outlawed the future use of cryopreservation 
by prohibiting clinics from creating more pre-embryos in a single cycle than would 
be transferred in that cycle.
277
 The initial draft also limited the number of acceptable 
transfers in a given cycle to two pre-embryos for women under forty, and three pre-
embryos for women over forty.
278
 Opponents successfully lobbied against these 
provisions by arguing that they would impede infertility treatments.
279
 Indeed, since 
passage of Italy’s very restrictive regulations on IVF, the rate of Italians seeking 
fertility treatments in other countries (fertility tourism) has tripled.
280
 Nonetheless, 
the original language proposed in Georgia
281
 highlights the type of restrictions we 
might expect if a personhood measure passes in the future.  
One possible result of such restrictions would be the devotion of further 
research to improving techniques for freezing and thawing ova which, while 
currently considered experimental,
282
 would not involve a risk to human life under a 
personhood framework. Although freezing and thawing eggs has historically been 
                                                 
274 See, e.g., Georgia’s “Personhood Amendment” Passes with a Super Majority, GA. RIGHT TO 
LIFE (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.grtl.org/?q=node/270; see also Jim Galloway, A House Democrat to 
Sponsor Personhood Amendment, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://blogs.ajc.com/political-insider-jim-galloway/2011/11/15/a-house-democrat-to-sponsor-
personhood-amendment/. 
275  Betsy McKay, In-Vitro Fertilization Limit is Sought, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123603828823714509.html. 
276  S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7-64(a) (Ga. 2009), available at 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf. 
277 Id. at § 19-7-66. A more recent bill that was proposed to accompany a personhood amendment 
in North Dakota was struck down by the State Senate that would have similarly restricted the number 
of embryos created to those that would be transferred in a given cycle. S .B. 2302, 63d Legis. Assemb., 
§7 (N.D. 2013), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/63-2013/documents/13-8231-
02000.pdf?20130213153739 
278  S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7-67 (Ga. 2009), available at 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf. At least with respect to the number of transfers 
permitted, the legislation is not dramatically different than the recommendations and guidelines established 
by the American Society of Reproductive Medicine, or current practices within IVF clinics in the United 
States. See infra notes 328-33 and accompanying text. This suggests an area where those in favor of IVF 
may find common ground with personhood proponents.  
279 See, e.g., The National Infertility Association and Supporters Defeat Dangerous Georgia Bill, 
RESOLVE: NAT’L INFERTILITY ASS’N (Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.resolve.org/about/resolve-the-
national-infertility-association-and-supporters-defeat-dangerous-georgia-bill.html (recounting how 
“the outrage from the family building community forced Georgia legislators to backpedal, re -write, 
and delete many of the provisions of the bill that would have harmed infertility patients”).  
280 Wise, supra note 271, at 181. 
281 The version of S.B. 169 that passed in the Senate does not contain the language regarding 
cryopreservation or limited pre-embryo transfer. See S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7 
(Ga. 2009), available at http://legiscan.com/GA/text/SB169/2009 (permitting pre-embryo 
cryopreservation, though limiting the ways in which pre-embryos may be created, and providing that 
pre-embryos may be created “solely for the purposes of initiating a human pregnancy”).  
282  Lisa Campo-Engelstein, Insurance Coverage for Cancer Treatment-Induced Conditions: 
Comparing Fertility Preservation Technology and Breast Reconstructive Surgery , 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 
849, 856 (2012) (noting that the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) still considers 
egg cryopreservation to be experimental); see also U.B. Wennerhold et al., Children Born After 
Cryopreservation of Embryos or Oocytes: A Systematic Review of Outcome Data, 24 HUMAN REPROD. 
2158, 2169 (2009), available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/9/2158.full.pdf+html 
(stating that data on children born after egg cryopreservation is “sparse”).  
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less successful than freezing and thawing pre-embryos,
283
 recent reports suggest that 
methods are improving.
284
 Success in this endeavor would also address the issue of 
women having to undergo multiple egg-extraction procedures where pre-embryo 
cryopreservation is prohibited.  
2. Preimplantation Genetic Screening
285
 
Regardless of whether fresh or thawed pre-embryos are to be transferred, the 
participants in IVF increasingly choose to have PGS performed.
286
 PGS requires the 
removal of one of the cells from a four- to eight-cell pre-embryo and testing it for 
certain genetic characteristics.
287
 At the point when PGS is performed, each cell 
within the pre-embryo contains a fully-assembled, though inactive genome, and each 
cell is totipotent, with the capability of developing into a separate human being.
288
 
Because the extracted cell is destroyed in the testing process, if the cell itself is 
considered a separate person that would obviously seem problematic.
289
  
That said, PGS can be used to identify genetic abnormalities that would not 
have been caught through the visual inspection of the pre-embryos.
290
 The most 
severe abnormalities are fatal, but under current practice, if PGS reveals any 
unwanted genetic characteristic (for instance, trisomy 21—Down syndrome) the pre-
embryos would typically just be discarded or donated for research.
291
 Clinics have 
also permitted the use of PGS for purposes of selecting pre-embryos for implantation 
that have certain desired traits such as a particular gender or those likely to develop 
into children with deafness or dwarfism.
292
 And again, if infertility treatment ends 
before the supply of pre-embryos is exhausted, the unused pre-embryos (including 
those without the desired gender or those likely to develop into hearing children or 
children of normal height) are typically discarded or donated for research.
293
 
Discarding or donating pre-embryos for research would be problematic under a 
personhood framework that strives to protect human life regardless of disability or 
the existence of particular genetic traits. 
                                                 
283 Fuselier, supra note 236, at 147. 
284  Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Genetically Related Children: Harvesting of Gametes from 
Deceased or Incompetent Persons, J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 147, 158 n.50 (2011) (citing Briana 
Rudick et al., The Status of Oocyte Cryopreservation in the United States , 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
2642, 2642-46 (2010)). 
285 PGS is used here to refer to any genetic testing of pre-embryos, though some commentators 
distinguish between PGS and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). See, e.g., Jaime King, Duty to 
the Unborn: A Response to Smolensky, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 377, 379 n.15 (2008) (using the term PGD 
with reference to testing for specific genetic or chromosomal diseases).  
286 The use of PGS has grown significantly since its introduction in the late 1980s. King , supra 
note 285, at 290 n.28.  
287 Peters, supra note 174, at 216.  
288 Id. at 210-16. 
289 For instance, Germany’s Embryo Protection Act includes in its definition of “embryo” “each 
totipotent cell removed from an embryo that is assumed to be able to divide and to develop into an 
individual under the appropriate conditions.” Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG][The 
Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 (Ger.), 
translation available at http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf. 
290 King, supra note 285, at 292. 
291 Id. at 291. In addition to identifying chromosomal abnormalities, PGS can be used to screen 
for genetic markers associated with disorders such as Tay-Sachs and Huntington’s, or for 
predispositions to certain cancers. Id. at 296.  
292 Id. at 295-96. 
293 Peters, supra note 174, at 217. 
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Beyond this, the cell biopsy used to extract the cell to test for genetic 
characteristics creates the risk of causing damage to the pre-embryo that could 
render it unfit for implantation or otherwise lead to birth defects.
294
 As Professor 
King has noted, the nature and extent of these risks are not well understood.
295
 Logic 
might suggest that pre-embryos lacking genetic abnormalities have a higher 
probability of leading to successful pregnancy in a given IVF cycle, but certain 
studies have shown that pre-embryos implanted after PGS are less likely to result in 
pregnancy and birth.
296
 More research is needed to determine whether the process of 
PGS itself is to blame for this increased IVF mortality rate for pre-embryonic 
persons.
297
 Further, even if implantation and birth are successful, there is the 
possibility that removing a cell from the pre-embryo could cause developmental and 
other health problems later in life.
298
 Knowingly exposing pre-embryonic persons to 
these as-yet unquantifiable risks of death or injury could be viewed as problematic 
under a personhood framework. 
A significant problem with PGS has to do with the lack of benefit that such 
testing provides to the pre-embryonic person involved (notwithstanding the clear 
benefit to the prospective parents seeking the testing), especially when considering 
the risks inherent in the procedure.
299
 We currently lack the technology to perform 
genetic modification or alteration to correct any genetic abnormality that might be 
discovered using PGS.
300
 If the IVF patients planned to transfer the pre-embryos 
regardless of the PGS results, then perhaps the pre-embryo would benefit in the 
future to the extent the patients used this information to plan for raising a child with 
the identified condition. But this attenuated benefit would not seem to justify 
exposing the pre-embryos to the risks of death or injury identified here.  
Beyond this type of utilitarian assessment, the President’s Council on Bioethics 
noted that, particularly in the context of using PGS to identify a donor match for an 
                                                 
294 King, supra note 285, at 287. 
295 Id. at 291-96, 303-08. 
296 Id. at 292 n.37, 297. The study indicated a 37% live birth rate for IVF patients, decreasing to 
25% for patients undergoing PGS. Id. at 287 n.16, 307.  
297 Id. at 308. 
298 Id. at 307 (noting that the extent of this risk is unknown since many of the children born after 
a PGS cycle are not yet through puberty).  
299 For purposes of this paper I will bracket off the issue that some couples may only reproduce 
because of the availability of PGS, and therefore, PGS could be argued to provide the benefit of 
existence itself. This argument could be used by a patient only willing to pa rent a deaf child, which 
PGS makes possible through pre-embryo selection. In addition to the benefit, Parfit’s Non-Identity 
Problem could be utilized to suggest that the decision to use PGS cannot be said to harm these 
resulting persons who are better off alive than not (at least assuming a life worth living). See PARFIT, 
supra note 270, at 358-61. But if the decision to use PGS is made after the pre-embryonic person is 
already in existence (for instance by a couple in the midst of using IVF), then the Non-Identity 
Problem would not appear to be implicated assuming we consider the genetic interventi on to be 
identity preserving, and it is therefore possible to assess whether PGS causes or creates a risk of harm 
to this identified person. See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, 
and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 352-53 (2008); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating 
Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions , 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 299, 332-33 (2008). Of course, if the genetic intervention is viewed to be identity 
changing, then the argument could be made that this “new,” post-intervention person has not been 
harmed, since but for the intervention she would not exist. See supra notes 268-71 and accompanying 
text for additional discussion of this issue.  
300 See John A. Robertson, Extending Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: The Ethical Debate , 
18 HUM. REPROD. 465, 470 (2003), available at 
http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/18/3/465.full.pdf (explaining that controversial uses of 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis would increase if technology for further genetic testing was 
available). 
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already born sibling, PGS could also raise a Kantian
301
 concern that such testing 
treats pre-embryonic persons as “a means for the benefit of another.”302 These issues 
become more apparent when considering that in the absence of PGS, all pre-embryos 
that pass visual inspection would likely be implanted or at least temporarily 
cryopreserved.
303
  
Leaving aside the eugenic implications of using PGS to select offspring with 
desired traits,
304
 under a personhood framework, PGS would appear to be 
particularly susceptible to outlaw or severe restriction due to the risks involved and 
the questionable benefits to the pre-embryonic persons on whom testing is 
performed.
305
 Although currently unregulated in the United States,
306
 other countries 
offer examples of what such restrictions on PGS might look like.
307
 
Italy, Austria, and Switzerland have statutes that ban the practice of PGS 
altogether.
308
 In addition, the Embryo Protection Act in Germany was historically 
interpreted to provide a blanket prohibition on PGS,
309
 but a recent court decision
310
 
led to subsequent legislation that now permits PGS in the narrow circumstances 
where the parents have a high risk of passing on a serious genetic disease, or where 
the pre-embryo is suspected of carrying a defect that creates a high feasibility of 
miscarriage or stillbirth.
311
 At the time, three bills were considered in Germany, one 
of which would have explicitly prohibited all PGS.
312
 Those disfavoring any 
                                                 
301 Utilitarianism and Kantianism are two moral theories that have had profound influence on 
Western legal philosophy. See, e.g., JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 
67-98 (1990). Kant himself might dispute the personhood (or humanity) of pre-embryos given their 
inability to engage in rational behavior. Id. at 77. 
302  PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE REGULATION OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGIES 96 
(2004), http://bioethics.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/reproductionandresponsibility/_pcbe_final_repr  
oduction_and_responsibility.pdf. 
303 By avoiding immediate destruction these pre-embryos would stand the chance of being saved 
by a subsequent personhood framework that would outlaw destruction. 
304  See generally Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our 
Eugenic Past—Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125 (2003) (exploring the history of eugenics 
and how that history should inform regulation of ART). 
305 See generally Glenn L. Schattman, Lack of Benefit of Pre-Implantation Genetic Screening, 1 
BIENNIAL REV. INFERTILITY 289 (2009) (explaining that PGS may reduce a woman’s chance of having 
a child). 
306 See Benjamin B. Williams, Note, Screening for Children: Choice and Change in the “Wild 
West” of Reproductive Medicine, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1305, 1306-07 n.10 (2011). 
307 King, supra note 285, at 136-37. 
308 Id. at 137. Italy’s outright ban of PGS was condemned recently by the European Court of 
Human Rights in a case involving an Italian couple (both carriers of cystic fibrosis) prevented from 
utilizing PGS. Europe Rights Court Condemns Italy Ban on Embryo Testing , RAW STORY (Aug. 28, 
2012), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/08/28/europe-rights-court-condemns-italy-ban-on-embryo-
testing/ (noting that “of 32 Council of Europe member states examined, only Italy, Austria and 
Switzerland ban PGD testing”).  
309 King, supra note 285, at 137-38. (citing Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG][The 
Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 (Ger.), 
translation available at http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf). 
310 German Government Divided over Calls for Embryo Protection , SPIEGEL ONLINE (Jul. 12, 
2010), http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/bio-ethical-battleground-german-government-
divided-over-calls-for-embryo-protection-a-706040.html. 
311  Gesetz zur Regelung der Präimplantationsdiagnostik, Sept. 2, 2011, BUNDESRAT 
DRUCKSACHEN [BR] 480/11 (2011) (Ger.), available at 
http://www.bundesrat.de/cln_171/SharedDocs/Drucksachen/2011/0401-500/480-
11,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/480-11.pdf (unofficial translation provided by 
Professor Christoph Henkel, Mississippi College School of Law).  
312  Philippa Brice, Germany Debates Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, PHG FOUNDATION 
(Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.phgfoundation.org/news/8326/.  
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exceptions that would allow PGS argued that it is “unacceptable that [pre-]embryos 
could be destroyed through [PGS] procedures,” and that there should “be no 
selection between handicapped and non-handicapped life.”313 It is likely that the 
same arguments would be made in support of an absolute prohibition on PGS under 
a personhood framework, though certainly other countries regulate PGS without 
banning the procedure entirely.
314
  
3. Transfer, Selective Reduction, and Disposition of Unused Pre-Embryos 
After pre-embryos are successfully created, screened, and potentially frozen and 
thawed, decisions remain regarding how many to transfer to the woman, what to do 
in the event of multiple implantations, and what to do with any pre-embryos that 
remain unused. In reverse order, it would be problematic under a personhood 
framework to discard unused pre-embryos or to donate them for research. This is 
certainly true in Italy where all created pre-embryos must be implanted,
315
 and it is 
also the case in Germany where “[a]nyone who disposes of” a pre-embryo or “uses it 
for a purpose not serving its preservation” will be imprisoned for up to three 
years.
316
 In the United States, Louisiana already makes it is illegal to intentionally 
destroy viable pre-embryos,
317
 and any unused pre-embryos must be made available 
for adoption by other IVF patients.
318
 Not surprisingly, the initial draft of the 
proposed personhood legislation in Georgia also specifically prohibited the 
intentional destruction of pre-embryos for any purpose
319
 and, as mentioned, even 
the revised Georgia language states that pre-embryos may be created “solely for the 
purposes of initiating a human pregnancy.”320 
Continuing in reverse order, it is also readily apparent that selective 
reductions—termination of certain fetuses when multiple implantations occur321—
would be frowned upon by personhood proponents. This technique may be utilized 
to make it safer for the woman and the remaining fetuses, or simply when the 
intended parents do not desire to have multiple children, whether the pregnancy is 
                                                 
313 Government Divided, supra note 310. 
314 See generally King, supra note 285 (exploring regulatory models from other countries and 
offering a proposal for regulation of PGS in the United States). Professor King notes that in the 
Netherlands PGS can only be used to identify “serious conditions,” with a goal of bringing about the 
birth of a healthy child. Id. at 166. Personhood proponents would likely be unwilling to entertain a 
discussion about whether certain conditions are serious enough to permit the destruction of a human 
person, and even if the probability of miscarriage or stillbirth was 100%, proponents may not feel that 
PGS is justified. 
315 See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text. 
316 Gesetz zum Schutz von Embryonen [ESchG] [The Embryo Protection Act], Dec. 13, 1990, 
BUNDESRAT DRUCKSACHEN [BR], 69/90 at 2746 § 2.1 (Ger.), translation available at 
http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480804/publicationFile/5162/EmbryoProtectionAct.pdf . 
317 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (2008). 
318 Id. § 9:130. 
319  S.B. 169, 150th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. § 19-7-63(a) (Ga. 2009), available at 
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20092010/89683.pdf 
320 See supra note 281. 
321 See ASRM, Criteria for Number of Embryos to Transfer: A Committee Opinion , 99 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 44, 44-45 (2013), available at 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guidelines/Gui
delines_and_Minimum_Standards/Guidelines_on_number_of_embryos%281%29.pdf [hereinafter 
ASRM Transfer Guidelines]; Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy: Lifeboat 
Ethics in the Womb, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 773, 777-82 (1992) (describing the procedure as involving 
the insertion of a needle through the woman’s abdomen and into the chest of the fetus to inject 
potassium chloride in order to stop the fetal heart). 
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being carried by the intended mother or a gestational surrogate.
322
 It is very unlikely 
that personhood proponents would treat selective reduction differently than any 
other procedure that terminates a fetus (or pre-embryo for that matter),
323
 though 
keeping in mind the exceptions available considering the life and health of the 
woman experiencing a high-order multiple pregnancy.
324
 Proponents also would be 
very cognizant of the risk that selective reduction could lead to termination of the 
entire pregnancy.
325
 Even the American Society of Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) 
acknowledges that high-order multiple pregnancies should be avoided due to the 
risks created for the women and fetuses involved.
326
  
In fact, Octomom
327
 was identified as a primary reason behind the legislation 
proposing IVF restrictions in Georgia.
328
 ASRM reported that “in 2000, more than 
two-thirds of all IVF transfer procedures in the United States were of three or more 
embryos.” 329  While there are no laws currently governing the number of pre-
embryos that may be transferred in a given IVF cycle in the United States, fertility 
organizations have offered guidelines calling for a reduced number.
330
 For instance, 
today ASRM and the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) 
recommend that for women under thirty-five, consideration should be given to 
implanting only one pre-embryo, and no more than two; though the guidelines still 
                                                 
322  See Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 391 (2011) (describing a recent dispute between two 
Americans who only wanted one child and their surrogate stemming from the surrogate’s 
unwillingness to abide by a contract term that would have required her to undergo a selective 
reduction after she discovered she was carrying twins). It is not my intent to suggest that most 
selective reductions are sought simply because the intended parents prefer fewer children; only that it 
can happen.  
323 Cf. Daar, supra note 321, at 796-806; Stacey Pinchuk, A Difficult Choice in a Different Voice: 
Multiple Birth, Selective Reduction and Abortion, 7 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 29, 34-36 (2000) 
(each distinguishing selective reduction from abortion by noting, for instance, that in the former the 
terminated fetuses are not removed from the woman, and the intent is not to end the entire pregnancy). 
Professor Daar goes as far as to say that this difference with respect to intent “so separates these two 
procedures as to render them wholly distinguishable.” Daar, supra note 322, at 783. While personhood 
proponents may be able to live with a selective reduction when the woman’s life is threatened, I am 
not convinced that they would view the procedure to be so different than abortion as to make it 
permissible when a patient simply prefers to raise fewer children or even when her health (as opposed 
to life) is at risk.  
324 See supra notes 129-43 and accompanying text. 
325 Kathleen Lee, In Support of a Gender-Neutral Framework for Resolving Selective Reduction 
Disputes, 44 FAM. L.Q. 135, 140 (2010) (noting that the risk of terminating the entire pregnancy 
increases as the number of original fetuses increases). 
326 See ASRM Transfer Guidelines, supra note 321. 
327 When Nadya Suleman underwent IVF in 2008, twelve pre-embryos were transferred six 
successfully implanted, with two twinning, resulting in the gestation of eight fetuses. This instance 
earned her the popular nickname “Octomom.” See Alan Duke, Nadya Suleman’s Doctor Loses 
California Medical License, CNN (Jun. 2, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-06-
01/us/california.octuplets.doctor.revoked_1_kamrava-fertility-doctor-embryos?_s=PM:US; Lawyer: 
Octuplets’ Mom Implanted with 12 Embryos, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 19, 2010, 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/39738767/ns/today-today_news/t/lawyer-octuplets-mom-implanted-
embryos/#.UDo0KaD2bPg. 
328 See McKay, supra note 275. 
329  ASRM, Elective Single-Embryo Transfer, 97 FERTILITY & STERILITY 835, 835 (2012), 
available at 
http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM_Content/News_and_Publications/Practice_Guidelines/Co
mmittee_Opinions/eSET-nonprintable.pdf [hereinafter ASRM Single-Embryo]. 
330 See, e.g., ASRM Transfer Guidelines, supra note 321. 
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suggest that it is acceptable for up to five cleavage-stage pre-embryos (two or three 
days after fertilization) to be implanted in women over forty.
331
  
Further, data collected by the CDC suggest that, even in the absence of 
regulation, in the vast majority of IVF cycles no more than two or three pre-embryos 
are transferred per cycle,
332
 and ASRM has documented a decrease in triplet 
gestation.
333
 There is even some evidence to suggest that mandated insurance 
coverage for IVF could lead to reduced multiple-embryo transfers, because there 
would be less financial pressure to be successful in fewer attempts.
334
 Nevertheless, 
if a personhood measure passes, restrictions on the number of pre-embryos that may 
be transferred in a given cycle are likely to follow to reduce the number of pre-
embryonic persons put at risk. This is particularly true given that some recent studies 
seem to suggest that increasing the number of pre-embryos transferred does not 
necessarily increase the likelihood of achieving a successful pregnancy.
335
 After a 
recent assessment of the literature on single-embryo transfer, ASRM determined that 
use of the procedure in the United States “has lagged behind that of many other 
countries,” and that “IVF centers should promote [the procedure] when appropriate 
through provider and patient education.”336 
Perhaps more controversially, the transfer of even a single pre-embryonic 
person during an IVF cycle could be considered problematic under a personhood 
framework.
337
 No clinic boasts a 100% success rate and every failed implantation 
results in the death of a pre-embryonic person. While the Federal Government does 
not regulate the practice of IVF, the CDC does collect data from clinics on their 
success rates.
338
  
The CDC breaks down IVF success rates into a number of categories, such as: 
age of the woman, whether frozen or fresh pre-embryos were transferred (including 
the number of pre-embryos transferred in a given cycle), and whether donor eggs 
were used.
339
 Nevertheless, it is difficult to ascertain the precise number of pre-
embryos transferred that survive through birth, because multiple pre-embryos are 
often transferred, each pre-embryo could itself divide to become a multiple, and the 
CDC reports multiple-infant births as one live birth. For purposes here the point can 
be made by noting that in 2010 the CDC reported that only 36.5% of the fresh, non-
donor pre-embryos that were transferred to women under the age of thirty-five 
actually implanted, with the percentage of implantation decreasing dramatically for 
                                                 
331 ASRM Transfer Guidelines, supra note 321. 
332 See CDC 2010 ART REPORT, supra note 264. Similar data were reported by SART. See Clinic 
Summary Report, SART (2010), 
https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_PublicMultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0. 
333 ASRM Single-Embryo, supra note 329, at 835. 
334 See I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive Technology and Adoption: 
Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and Should it Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 503-04 
(2010). 
335 See, e.g., Catherine Pearson, IVF Study Shows 2 Eggs are Good, 3 Too Many, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/12/ivf-study-shows-2-eggs-
ar_n_1202020.html (discussing a study in the United Kingdom indicating that implanting three pre-
embryos instead of two does not increase the likelihood of pregnancy); Tiffany Sharples, IVF Study: 
Two Embryos No Better than One, TIME, Mar. 30, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1888299,00.html (identifying a study in Finland 
suggesting “there is “no advantage to multiple-embryo implantation”).  
336 ASRM Single-Embryo, supra note 329, at 839. 
337 This issue alone deserves its own article, but it is at least worth mentioning here to highlight 
discussions that may be had when operating under a personhood framework. 
338 See CDC 2010 ART REPORT, supra note 264. 
339 Id. 
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women over the age of thirty-five.
340
 Given that not all of these implantations 
resulted in a live birth (due to miscarriage or stillbirth), we can conservatively say 
that in 2010 upwards of sixty-five percent of the pre-embryonic persons utilized in 
IVF in this country died in the process.
341
 Under a personhood framework, one could 
question whether it is acceptable to knowingly subject these pre-embryonic persons 
to such a high risk of death.  
Admittedly, while this suggests that IVF causes a tremendous loss of pre-
embryonic life, we should keep in mind that when fertilization occurs naturally in 
the human reproductive process, fifty percent of such fertilized ova are thought to be 
expelled prior to implantation, and often without the women even knowing 
fertilization took place.
342
 However, in any given month where a couple has 
unprotected sex and the woman does not become pregnant, it is impossible to know 
whether fertilization actually occurred.
343
 It would thus be inaccurate to claim that 
every time a couple has unprotected sex they create a fifty percent chance of killing 
a pre-embryonic person.
344
 In the context of IVF, however, it is possible to assess the 
risk to which an existing pre-embryonic person will be exposed by the transfer 
process.
345
 And according to the CDC, a fresh pre-embryonic person created using a 
donor egg and transferred into a woman under the age of thirty-five stands a much 
higher chance of surviving (and being born) than would a fresh pre-embryonic 
person created from a non-donor egg and transferred to a woman over the age of 
forty-two.
346
  
It is true that the death caused by a failed IVF transfer would not likely be 
considered intentional (at least using a specific intent definition) under the revised 
personhood language being proposed, but the inquiry should not end there.
347
 
Whether it is acceptable to intentionally create people only to subject them to such a 
high risk of mortality is an inquiry that would seem necessary when evaluating the 
ultimate permissibility of IVF under a personhood framework. As discussed in 
relation to contraception, however, the mere risk of death alone should be 
insufficient to necessitate a ban on IVF. Rather, at least with respect to yet-to-be 
created pre-embryonic persons, attention should be paid to whether the risk 
outweighs the societal benefits, and/or whether certain restrictions could be imposed 
to bring the level of risk to an acceptable level.
348
 Such restrictions might include 
limiting the number of pre-embryos that may be created and transferred in a given 
cycle, or outlawing IVF for individuals with a very low chance of success.  
                                                 
340 Id. The majority of cycles were performed on women over thirty five, with implantation rates 
of 26.9% (ages thirty-five to thirty-seven); 17.7% (ages thirty-eight to forty); 9.6% (ages forty-one to 
forty-two); and 4.2% (ages forty-three and up). Id. Similar data were reported by SART. See SART 
Report, supra note 332. 
341 See CDC 2010 ART REPORT, supra note 264. 
342 Sandel, supra note 150, at 208. 
343 See discussion supra Part III B and notes 149-50. 
344 See discussion supra Part III B and notes 149-50. 
345 See CDC 2010 ART REPORT, supra note 264. 
346 Id. (indicating that the percentages of transfers resulting in live birth are 55.8% and 7.4%, 
respectively). This statistic does not reflect the percentage of pre-embryos that survive through birth, 
because each transfer will involve multiple pre-embryos, not all of whom will survive even when a 
transfer results in a live birth. 
347 See supra notes 140, 148-50 and accompanying text. 
348 Military drafts come to mind as a situation where persons are unwillingly subjected to a 
known and significant risk of death for the greater benefit of society, though there are obvious 
differences between the two.  
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For presently existing pre-embryonic persons (like those in a current state of 
cryopreservation), the inquiry would likely focus on whether thawing and transfer 
are in such persons’ best interests. 349  Personhood proponents seek to give pre-
embryonic persons the same legal and moral status as every other born person, and 
without entertaining any sort of qualitative assessment about the value of such 
person’s life.350 By analogy, if we understood that using disposable diapers created a 
fifty percent chance of newborn death, would we nonetheless allow parents to use 
disposable diapers? Instead, we might expect a moratorium on disposable diapers, 
notwithstanding their convenience to parents, until research developed significantly 
safer disposable diapers.  
Parents obviously enjoy substantial constitutional protection to make decisions 
regarding the upbringing of their children,
351
 but given the children’s right to life, 
“the State, as parens patriae, has a ‘wide range of power for limiting parental 
freedom and authority in things affecting the child’s welfare.’”352 In the medical 
context in particular, courts have struggled to identify the scope of parental decision-
making authority.
353
 IVF patients could argue that being born, as opposed to 
remaining in a pre-embryonic state, is in the best interests of the given child, since 
birth offers the brightest future whereby the child would experience all that life has 
to offer. They may even argue that this better future is worth the risk of death 
associated with the IVF process. Indeed, parents make decisions every day that they 
hope will create the brightest future for their children.  
But keeping in mind that under a personhood framework the pre-embryonic 
person already has full legal and moral status, without reference to qualitative 
assessments about their life,
354
 the counter argument might look something like this: 
while it may be true that, as compared to sitting on the couch every day watching 
Keeping up with the Kardashians,
355
 parents have the best interests of their children 
in mind when forcing them to attend a four-year college (thereby offering them the 
best chance of a bright future); if attendance at that school carries with it  a fifty 
percent (or greater) chance of death, would the parents still be justified in forcing 
their children off the couch? The purpose of this paper is not to resolve this 
argument, but only to raise it as an illustration of why IVF may be at risk of 
significant restriction under a personhood framework.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The goal of the Personhood Movement is to create a framework in which human 
life is extended constitutional protection from the earliest moments of biological 
development, without exception.
356
 Although personhood proponents may be evasive 
                                                 
349 See supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text. 
350 See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text.  
351 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000). 
352 Jonathan F. Will, My God My Choice: The Mature Minor Doctrine and Adolescent Refusal of 
Life-Saving or Sustaining Medical Treatment Based Upon Religious Beliefs, 22 J. CONT. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 233, 248 (2006) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944)).  
353 Id. at 246-54 (discussing the scope of parental authority in the context of medical decision -
making). 
354 See supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text. 
355  Kim Kardashian’s own experience with egg cryopreservation was shared on national 
television. Abbey Stone, Kim Kardashian Prepares for Motherhood by Freezing Her Eggs , 
HOLLYWOOD.COM (Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.hollywood.com/news/celebrities/40144952/kim-
kardashian-prepares-for-motherhood-by-freezing-her-eggs?page=all. 
356 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text. 
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in public debates, if passed, the revised personhood measures being proposed across 
the country that include this unqualified, biological definition of life, are likely to 
have significant impacts on reproductive choice. This highlights why it is important 
to confront what accepting pre-embryonic personhood would mean. 
If proponents intend to remain consistent with the personhood position, then any 
forms of contraception or reproductive technologies that place pre-embryonic 
persons at significant risk of injury or death become problematic. This is not to say 
that, from a normative standpoint, all such reproductive choices ought to be banned 
outright. Rather, to maintain consistency with the position we ought to ask whether 
such activities create an unacceptable risk of loss of human life, and/or whether such 
activities are in the best interests of the pre-embryonic persons involved. The 
purpose of this article has not been to answer those questions; only to create a space 
for those discussions to be held, and to offer examples of what the restrictions on 
reproductive choice coming out of those discussions might look like.
357
   
                                                 
357 See supra note 237. 
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APPENDIX I: PROPOSED COLORADO PERSONHOOD AMENDMENT 
 
SECTION 32. THE RIGHT TO LIFE.  
(1) PURPOSE. In order to affirm basic human dignity, be it resolved that the right 
to life in this constitution applies equally to all innocent persons. 
 
(2) EFFECT. The intentional killing of any innocent person is prohibited. 
(a) Only birth control that kills a person shall be affected by this section. 
(b) Only in vitro fertilization and assisted reproduction that kills a person 
shall be affected by this section. 
(c) Medical treatment for life threatening physical conditions intended to 
preserve life shall not be affected by this section. 
(d) Spontaneous miscarriages shall not be affected by this section. 
(e) No innocent child created through rape or incest shall be killed for the 
crime of his or her father. 
 
(3) DEFINITIONS. As used in this section, 
(a) “Person” applies to every human being regardless of the method of 
creation. 
(b) A “human being” is a member of the species homo sapiens at any stage 
of development. 
(c) “Spontaneous miscarriage” is the unintentional termination of a 
pregnancy. 
(d) “Child” includes a human being prior to and during birth. 
(e) “Medical treatment for life threatening physical conditions intended to 
preserve life” includes but is not limited to treatment for cancer, ectopic and 
molar pregnancy, twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome, and placenta previa. 
 
(4) SELF-EXECUTING, AND SEVERABILITY PROVISION. All provisions of this 
section are self-executing and are severable.
 358
 
 
 
                                                 
358
 Colo. Initiative 46 (2011) (proposed COLO. CONST. art. II, § 32), available at 
http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/Initiatives/titleBoard/filings/2011-2012/46Final.pdf. 
